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The Elephant in the Room: An Empirical
Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the
Jurisdictional Context
King Fung Tsang*
I. INTRODUCTION
After a series of cases in the 1980s led by World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson1 and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California,2 the Supreme Court did not revisit the subject of personal
jurisdiction extensively until 2011 when it considered specific jurisdiction
in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro3 and general jurisdiction in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.4 Subsequently in 2014,
the Supreme Court further discussed the topic in Daimler AG v. Bauman.5
In particular, while discussing personal jurisdiction in both Goodyear and
Daimler, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there could be a potential
argument to acquire jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations by piercing
the corporate veil.6 However, the Court never discussed the substance of
this veil piercing in the context of jurisdiction because the plaintiffs either
forfeited the argument7 or failed to raise the argument in the first place.8
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong; J.D., LL.M., Columbia
Law School. The author would like to thank Professors James Feinerman and David Stewart for their
valuable comments on the early ideas of this paper. Any errors, however, are mine and mine alone.
1. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
2. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
3. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
4. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); see Patrick J.
Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011) (“[I]t marked for the first time in almost a quarter of a century
that the United States Supreme Court engaged in an extended discussion of the minimum contacts
test.”).
5. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
6. Id. at 759 (“Daimler argues, and several Courts of Appeals have held, that a subsidiary’s
jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter as
to be its alter ego.”); Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (“In effect, respondents would have us pierce
Goodyear corporate veils, at least for jurisdictional purposes.”).
7. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (“Neither below nor in their brief in opposition to the petition for
certiorari did respondents urge disregard of petitioners' discrete status as subsidiaries and treatment of
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Despite the lack of full development of jurisdictional piercing, lower courts
have since interpreted Goodyear and Daimler as positive precedents for the
doctrine.9 This sets the stage for a much-needed exploration of the
elephant in the room  jurisdictional piercing.
Jurisdictional piercing is the judicial process under which the separate
legal existence of a company is disregarded so as to make a shareholder of
the company subject to the personal jurisdiction of a court that it would not
otherwise be subject to. At times, the term “jurisdictional veil-piercing” is
used instead by courts10 and scholars.11 It is similar to, yet different from,
piercing the corporate veil as used in a liability context.12 Traditionally,
piercing the corporate veil is mostly used to make the shareholder liable for
the debt of the company by asking the court to disregard the limited
liability created by the incorporation of a company (hereinafter “liability
piercing”).13 In both liability piercing and jurisdictional piercing, the court
is asked to disregard the separate legal existence of a company, but the
former is for the purpose of busting the limit on liability, while the latter is
to extend the limit of jurisdiction of the court from the company to the
shareholder. Thus, “liability is not to be conflated with amenability to suit

all Goodyear entities as a ‘unitary business,’ so that jurisdiction over the parent would draw in the
subsidiaries as well. Respondents have therefore forfeited this contention, and we do not address it.”)
(citations omitted).
8. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 (“While plaintiffs ultimately persuaded the Ninth Circuit to impute
MBUSA’s California contacts to Daimler on an agency theory, at no point have they maintained that
MBUSA is an alter ego of Daimler.”).
9. On Goodyear, see e.g., Viega GmbH v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. 328 P.3d 1152, 1157 (Nev. 2014)
(“Subsidiaries’ contacts have been imputed to parent companies only under narrow exceptions to this
general rule, including ‘alter ego’ theory and, at least in cases of specific jurisdiction, the ‘agency’
theory. The alter ego theory allows plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil to impute a subsidiary’s
contacts to the parent company by showing that the subsidiary and the parent are one and the same.”)
(citations omitted); see also Beach v. Citigroup Alt. Invs. LLC, No. 12 Civ. 7717(PKC), 2014 WL
904650, at *10 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014) (“As with a finding of presence for jurisdictional purposes
through a corporate parent, a finding of corporate presence through the presence of a parent company to
find local harm requires an inquiry analogous to piercing the corporate veil.”). On Daimler, see
NYKCool A.B. v. Pacific Intern. Servs., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 385, 393 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) (“The Court
did not express any doubt as to the soundness of an alter ego theory of jurisdiction, which is present
only in the rather different circumstance in which one person or entity truly dominates another so that
the two are indistinguishable for practical purposes.”); see also Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova
Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2014).
10. See, e.g., PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 172 (Tex. 2007).
11. See, e.g., Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1023, 1033 (2004).
12. See Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Liability and jurisdiction are
independent.”).
13. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1036, 1036 (1991) (“‘Piercing the corporate veil’ refers to the judicially imposed exception to [limited
liability] by which courts disregard the separateness of the corporation and hold a shareholder
responsible for the corporation's action as if it were the shareholder’s own.”).
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in a particular forum,”14 and either type of piercing could be raised
independently or with one another.15
While jurisdictional piercing had never been fully explained by the
Supreme Court, it was not exactly a novel concept. As far back as 1925,
Justice Brandeis declined to disregard the corporate existence of the
Alabama subsidiary of Cudahy Packing Company, a Maine corporation in
order to subject the latter to the jurisdiction of North Carolina in Cannon
Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.16 Framing the issue as to
whether “the court lacked jurisdiction because the defendant, a foreign
corporation was not within the state,”17 Justice Brandeis made one of the
most oft-quoted statements on piercing the corporate veil: “The corporate
separation, though perhaps merely formal, was real. It was not pure
fiction.”18 Despite not using the term jurisdictional piercing nor even
piercing the corporate veil,19 the Supreme Court clearly analyzed the
possibility of extending the North Carolina court’s jurisdiction on the
concept of piercing the corporate veil. While Cannon is still considered
valid law,20 it leaves plenty of question marks over its status in the
contemporary jurisdiction regime. In particular, it is not clear whether
Justice Brandeis was deciding the matter on federal or state law. Although
he said that the case was not based on an interpretation of the
Constitution,21 Cannon was decided before Erie Railroad Co. v.

14. Am. Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.
1996).
15. E.g., Geanacopulos v. Narconon Fresh Start, 39 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1135 (D. Nev. 2014)
(finding both liability piercing and jurisdictional piercing against out-of-state parent company).
16. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
17. Id. at 336.
18. Id. at 337.
19. The court below had drawn analogy to liability piercing, though not using that term. See
Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 292 F. 169, 176 (W.D.N.C. 1923), aff’d, 267 U.S. 333 (1925)
(“If the issue I am passing upon were a question of preventing fraud through a corporate fiction or of
preventing an escape from just liability, the court would have little trouble in holding that there is such
identity between the two corporations as to enable the court to prevent fraud; but while the courts
generally have held that they will look through corporate fictions to prevent such fraud or to enforce
just liability, yet I know of no case where it has been found that a separate legal corporate entity can
have process served upon it and such process take the place of process on some other separate legal
corporate entity.”).
20. See William A. Voxman, Jurisdiction over a Parent Corporation in its Subsidiary’s State of
Incorporation, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 337–38 (1992) (“One sign that the Cannon doctrine is still valid
is that the Supreme Court has never repudiated it despite having had occasion to do so. In fact, the
Court may have implicitly recognized the doctrine’s continuing validity in Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine.”). See also Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal
Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 (1986) (noting that Keeton
“may amount, in fact, to an explicit revival of the Cannon doctrine”).
21. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 336 (“No question of the constitutional powers of the State, or of the
federal Government, is directly presented.”).
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Tompkins,22 thus making it possible for the ruling to be based on federal
common law.23 In addition, the substantive test declared by Cannon seems
highly formalistic. Despite recognizing that the Maine parent corporation
dominated the Alabama subsidiary “immediately and completely,”24 the
court upheld the corporate existence of the subsidiary since its existence as
a distinct corporate entity was “in all respects observed.”25 The confusion
caused by these questions continues to date, prompting one commentator to
describe the law on jurisdictional piercing as “in a state of flux.”26
Through a carefully designed empirical research on cases decided in
the three full years (2012 to 2014) after the decisions of Goodyear and
McIntyre, this article surveys the contemporary practices of the courts on
jurisdictional piercing and attempts to determine the right test that courts
should apply. To be more specific, this article will explore the following
key questions:
1. In what situations is jurisdictional piercing generally applied?
a. What is the relationship between jurisdictional piercing and
liability piercing?
b. What is the relationship between jurisdictional piercing, agency
and direct jurisdiction?
2. How will jurisdictional piercing be applied?
a. Should state law or federal law govern the jurisdictional piercing
question? If it were state law, which state’s law?
b. Should the substantive test of jurisdictional piercing be the same
as that of liability piercing?
Section II sets out the background and importance of jurisdictional
piercing. Tracing the history of jurisdictional developments in the United
States, it highlights the way in which jurisdictional piercing has regained its
importance and how it is on the verge of opening a new stage of the
jurisdictional regime. The methodology of the empirical research will then
be described in Section III. Section IV first goes into detail on each of the
aforementioned questions and applies the findings of the empirical research
accordingly. Section V makes recommendations to improve the current

22. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Brillmayer & Paisley, supra note 20,
at 5 n.26 (“It is well understood since [Erie], that federal courts are not free to reexamine state decisions
of ‘general common law.’”).
23. See 1 PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS § 24.01, 24-4 (2d ed.,
2011–2012) (arguing that Cannon was “exclusively concerned with federal law”).
24. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 335.
25. Id.
26. See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 23-3.
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law based on the issues displayed in Section IV. Overall, the article finds
that subject to certain justifications, the test for jurisdictional piercing
should generally remain in the domain of state law. However, each state
should develop a jurisdictional specific test for the purpose of jurisdictional
piercing, instead of blindly adopting the liability piercing test.
II. BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTIONAL
PIERCING
Whilst the purpose of this article is not to give a detailed description
of the historical developments of personal jurisdiction, some background
information is necessary. Generally speaking, personal jurisdiction in the
United States has been developed in four stages with the latest stage still in
transition beginning with Goodyear and McIntyre.
A. STAGE 1 – TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
In McDonald v. Mabee, it was stated that: “[t]he foundation of
jurisdiction is physical power.”27 This is based on the fact that political
power exercised by the courts of a nation in general only goes as far as its
borders.28 Sovereignty and jurisdiction have always gone hand in hand
since the start of nations. In the Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws,29
Justice Story30 stated that the “first and most general maxim” of conflict of
laws is that “every nation possesses exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction
within its own territory.”31 Accordingly, early on, people within the
territory of a state were subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts.32 The
assumption of personal jurisdiction was effected through the service of
process to a person within the forum, and this remains a valid exercise of
jurisdiction to date.33 The prime case illustrating this form of jurisdiction is

27. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
28. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 77–78.
29. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN
REGARDS TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES,
DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS (1834).
30. Justice Story is widely regarded as “the father of the conflict of laws.” See Ernest G. Lorenzen,
Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws—One Hundred Years After, 48 HARV. L. REV. 15, 38
(1935).
31. STORY, supra note 29, at 19.
32. Id. at 20 (“The sovereign has power and authority over his subjects, and the goods, which they
possess within his dominions.”).
33. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (“Among the most firmly
established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have
jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in the State.”).
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Pennoyer v. Neff.34
In that case, Neff tried to recover a piece of land in Oregon from
Pennoyer. Relying on a sheriff’s deed made upon the sale of the subjected
property on execution issued upon a previous default judgment rendered
against Neff, Pennoyer claimed that he had valid title.35 The issue was thus
whether the previous default judgment was granted on a valid assumption
of jurisdiction when process had not been served on Neff within the state of
Oregon.36 Affirming the key role played by sovereignty mentioned above,
Justice Field stated that “every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.”37 He went on to
find for Neff. Pennoyer v. Neff has since been read as requiring the
presence of the defendant within the state for the assumption of personal
jurisdiction.38 Another key development in Pennoyer was the inclusion of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the jurisdictional
analysis. It was stated in the judgment that judgments without proper
jurisdiction violated due process of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The same concept of territorial jurisdiction was also reflected in the
court’s approach in dealing with corporations. For example, in Bank of
Augusta v. Earle,39 it was stated that:
A corporation can have no legal existence out of the
boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists
only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law; and
where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory,
the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the
place of its creation; and cannot migrate to another
sovereignty.40
Thus, the only forum in which to sue a corporation is its place of
incorporation.

34. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
35. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 715.
36. Id. at 721.
37. Id. at 722.
38. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“Historically the
jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the
defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him.”). See also 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter WRIGHT].
39. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839).
40. Id. at 588.
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This form of jurisdiction as elaborated in Pennoyer and Bank of
Augusta made sense when there was little travel across state borders and
business was mostly confined within the state. However, the economy
developed, and it was soon found to be insufficient.
1. Stage 1(a) – Presence and Consent
The rather simple basis of jurisdiction faced enormous challenges
during the Industrial Revolution.41 Gone was the simple world where
businesses tended to stay within the borders of a state from manufacture to
distribution to consumption.
Instead, business activities frequently
extended across state borders, creating a need for the court to assume
jurisdiction over out-of-state persons.42 Although not welcomed at first, the
increase in national business activities was accompanied by the rise of
limited liability companies.43 Unlike natural persons, legal persons are
capable of doing business in multiple states at the same time.44 This
presented a serious challenge to the territorial regime. Instead of asking
plaintiffs to travel to the home state of defendants for the lawsuits, it
became necessary for courts to develop certain ways to assume jurisdiction
over these out-of-state defendants.45
Two transitional concepts slowly developed to fill this gap–presence
and consent. In connection with presence, a corporation is subject to, other
than its state of incorporation, the jurisdiction of a state if “it is doing
business within the State in such manner and to such extent as to warrant
the inference that it is present there.”46 In addition, states also started to
require out-of-state corporations doing business in-state to appoint service
agents to receive process.47 This constitutes consent of the out-of-state
corporations to be subject to the jurisdiction.48
41. Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 588.
42. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 38, at § 1065.
43. See Dante Figueroa, Comparative Aspects of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States
and Latin America, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 683, 703 (2012) (“Limited liability statutes were not initially
enacted across the United States, because many jurisdictions imposed shareholder liability in a number
of areas of law for various causes of action.”).
44. See International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (“Since the corporate personality is a fiction,
although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual
its ‘presence’ without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities
carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it.”) (internal citation omitted). See also
WRIGHT, supra note 38, § 1066.
45. Id.
46. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
47. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (2008) (“Many
states require foreign corporations, as a condition for doing business in the forum state to appoint a
local agent for the receipt of service of process.”).
48. Id.
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Finally, one more possibility is piercing the corporate veil. However,
the occasions when such a doctrine was applicable as well as the
substantive test were all very uncertain from the beginning. The most
important case at the time was of course Cannon. As described above, the
Supreme Court refused to pierce the corporate veil of the out-of-state
Maine parent due to the proper maintenance of corporate formalities
between the Alabama subsidiary and the Maine parent. In fact, Cannon
shows how consent and presence worked together in this transitional era.
First, the Alabama subsidiary was subject to the jurisdiction of North
Carolina because it did business there and had appointed an agent to
receive service of process.49 This is apparently an illustration of consent.
Secondly, if the corporate formalities were not observed, it would then be
possible for the court to hold the Maine parent subject to the jurisdiction of
North Carolina, thus establishing “presence” of the Maine parent in North
Carolina.50
Eventually, however, the stop gap measures of presence and consent
proved insufficient. Presence was criticized for its lack of substance. In
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc.,51 Justice Learned Hand summarized
such criticism succinctly:
It scarcely advances the argument to say that a corporation
must be “present” in the foreign state, if we define that word
as demanding such dealings as will subject it to jurisdiction,
for then it does no more than put the question to be
answered. Indeed, it is doubtful whether it helps much in
any event. It is difficult, to us it seems impossible, to impute
the idea of locality to a corporation, except by virtue of those
acts which realize its purpose. When we say, therefore, that
a corporation may be sued only where it is “present” we
understand that the word is used, not literally, but as
shorthand for something else.52

49. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 292 F. 169, 174 (W.D.N.C. 1923) (“[Record]
showed that the Cudahy Packing Company of Alabama did business in the states of Alabama, Florida,
Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee. Frank H. Ross, care the Cudahy
Packing Company of Alabama, Charlotte, N.C., was the officer or agent in charge of its business in the
state of North Carolina, and upon whom process against the corporation may be served.”). Note,
however, that the Alabama subsidiary was not a defendant in the case.
50. Throughout Cannon, the Supreme Court has been framing the issue as one of presence. See
Cannon, 267 U.S. at 334–35 (“The main question for decision is whether, at the time of the service of
process, defendant was doing business within the state in such a manner and to such an extent as to
warrant the inference that it was present there.”).
51. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
52. Id. at 141.
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Similarly, the doctrine of consent was criticized by Justice Hand in
Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Co.53:
When it is said that a foreign corporation will be taken to
have consented to the appointment of an agent to accept
service, the court does not mean that as a fact it has
consented at all, because the corporation does not in fact
consent; but the court, for purposes of justice treats it as if it
had. . . . The court, in the interests of justice, imputes results
to the voluntary act of doing business within the foreign
state, quite independently of any intent.54
These all set the stage for the era of minimum contacts in Stage 2.
B. STAGE 2 – MINIMUM CONTACT
Whilst the doctrines of presence and consent helped alleviate the
problems by extending the traditional territorial basis of jurisdiction, they
were too artificial to truly address problems caused by the increasing interstate activities. This can be illustrated by the facts of International Shoe
Co. v. State of Washington.55
International Shoe was a company based in Delaware. For years, it
had sold shoes in Washington through a team of Washington-based
salesmen in order to solicit business there.56 Instead of setting up a branch
at a fixed location in Washington, the salesmen were given “a line of
samples . . . which they display[ed] to prospective purchasers. On occasion
they rent permanent sample rooms, for exhibiting samples, in business
buildings, or rented rooms in hotels or business buildings temporarily for
that purpose.”57 In addition, they had no authority to accept orders. All the
orders they solicited were to be transmitted to International Shoe’s office at
St. Louis for approval.58 The business operations of International Shoe in
Washington were organized in such a way only because this meant it could
not be considered to have a presence in Washington under the precedents at
the time, thus hoping to avoid being sucked into the jurisdiction of the state

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
Smolik, 222 F. at 151.
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 313–314.
Id. at 314.
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of Washington.59 When the state of Washington sued International Shoe
for unpaid taxes, this fact was expected to be its strongest defense.
When the case went to the Supreme Court, the Court saw the case as
an opportunity to reinvent the jurisdictional regime by introducing a more
common sense approach of minimum contacts. Instead of changing or
adding to the presence doctrine, Justice Black proclaimed that a person was
subject to the jurisdiction of a court as long as he had “certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”60 Applying
this new minimum contacts doctrine to International Shoe Co., the court
found the company’s business activities in the state of Washington to have
been systematic and continuous and, therefore, had no difficulty finding
minimum contacts.61
Since International Shoe, we have entered into the era of minimum
contacts. All the efforts of subsequent courts have been directed towards
interpreting and refining what “minimum contacts” mean and whether the
conduct of a person fits into that definition. Notably, there have been two
important interpretations, namely purposeful availment; and the distinction
between specific and general jurisdiction. First, the Supreme Court found
that “the constitutional touchstone remains whether [or not] the defendant
purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum state.”62 Then
the court asks “whether the defendant purposefully avails himself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.”63 With this, the court has injected a
mental aspect to the test.
Second, the Supreme Court further subdivides personal jurisdiction
into two categories: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction. These
two categories of personal jurisdiction are based on the reading of
International Shoe64 and adopted by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall.65 Specific jurisdiction stands for the kind
of personal jurisdiction that “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s

59. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315 (“Appellant also insists that its activities within the state
were not sufficient to manifest its ‘presence’ there and that in its absence the state courts were without
jurisdiction . . . . It refers to those cases in which it was said that the mere solicitation of orders for the
purchase of goods within a state, to be accepted without the state and filled by shipment of the
purchased goods interstate, does not render the corporation seller amenable to suit within the state.”).
60. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
61. Id. at 320.
62. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 747 (1985).
63. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
64. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136–64 (1966).
65. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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contacts with the forum.”66 At the other end of the spectrum, general
jurisdiction covers the situation where the suit does not “aris[e] out of or
relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum”67 yet the “continuous
corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature
as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities.”68
Overall, the minimum contacts era firmly establishes the long arm
jurisdiction of the courts beyond territorial jurisdiction. Specific and
general jurisdictions further set up the spectrum of the types of activities
that constitute minimum contacts, be it a one-off act directly related to the
suit in question or substantial activities in the forum that are unrelated to
the claim. It must also be noted that the minimum contacts test only serves
as the outer limit to the state’s long arm jurisdiction.69 States can set out
the extent of the long arm jurisdiction they wish to exercise by way of their
respective long arm statute as long as it is within the constitutional limit.70
For example, Ohio does not allow the assumption of general jurisdiction as
none of the prongs under the Ohio’s long arm statute allows for such a type
of jurisdiction.71 On the other hand, most states have extended their
jurisdiction under long arm statutes to the maximum limit allowed under
minimum contacts.72 For these states, the two prongs of jurisdiction
analysis (minimum contacts and state long-arm statute) have merged into
one and they simply need to apply the minimum contacts test.73
Finally, it must be noted that International Shoe did not refer to
Cannon nor jurisdictional piercing in general. However, as far as the
particular facts in Cannon are concerned, jurisdictional piercing is no
longer required under the minimum contacts test. In Cannon, the contract
which was the subject of complaint was entered into by a Maine parent
instead of the Alabama subsidiary.74 Considering that the dispute arose
66. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, 466 U.S. at 414.
67. Id.
68. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
69. See Le Bleu Corp. v. Standard Capital Grp., Inc., 11 F. App’x 377, 379 (4th Cir. 2001) (North
Carolina's long-arm statute “has been interpreted to extend to the outer limits allowed by the Due
Process Clause.”).
70. Id.
71. Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 717 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Ohio law does not appear to recognize
general jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, but instead requires that the court find specific
jurisdiction under one of the bases of jurisdiction listed in Ohio’s long-arm statute.”).
72. See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 23–29 n.22.
73. See, e.g., Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 2002) (“As Virginia’s
general long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by due process, the
statutory inquiry merges with the constitutional inquiry.”).
74. See Cannon, 292 F. at 170 (“The transactions out of which the alleged breach of contract in the
present case grew had no relation to any activity of the Alabama corporation. The alleged contract was
made solely with the packing company, the Maine Corporation . . . and the Alabama Corporation, as
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directly from a contract between the Maine parent corporation and the
North Carolina plaintiff, the suit should fall squarely within the specific
jurisdiction of the North Carolina court. However, what if the Maine
parent learned from the case and ring-fenced its jurisdictional exposure by
having the Alabama subsidiary enter into the transaction with the North
Carolina plaintiff? Will the court still have jurisdiction over the Maine
parent? The chess match between the court and the big corporations
continues in this latest stage of the jurisdictional development.
1. Stage 2(a) – Jurisdictional Piercing
Minimum contacts appear to solve a large part of the problem that
arises from out-of-state companies doing in-state business. However, the
outer limit of minimum contacts continues to be a matter of huge
controversy. For specific jurisdiction, the biggest problem is what is
known as the “stream of commerce.”75 This metaphor represents “an
extensive chain of distribution” that the product has been through before
reaching the ultimate consumer in product liability cases.76 If the out-ofstate defendant simply sold its products through this stream of commerce
through which it would be reasonably foreseeable to land in the hands of
the ultimate users in the forum, will that constitute a basis for the
assumption of specific jurisdiction by the forum court? In Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,77 the Supreme Court was split
on that question. Four justices led by Justice O’Connor opined that “the
placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more,”78
would not be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. There must be
additional conducts by the defendant that indicate “an intent or purpose to
serve the market in the forum State.”79 These include “designing the
product . . ., advertising . . ., establishing channels for providing regular
advice to customers . . ., or marketing the product through a distributor who
has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.”80 This is known
as the “stream of commerce plus” approach.81 On the other hand, four

such, is in no way concerned with the merits of the controversy.”).
75. This term was mentioned by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980) (“The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process
Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”).
76. Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2854–55 (2011).
77. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102.
78. Id. at 112.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 894 F. Supp. 2d 819, 844 (E.D.
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other justices led by Justice Brennan were of the opinion that the awareness
of the defendant of the distribution system along with economic benefits
that resulted from the sale would be sufficient for the finding of minimum
contacts.82 The court ultimately agreed to dismiss the case for failing to
comply with the reasonableness prong of International Shoe. By the time
of the trial, the original U.S. plaintiff had already settled with the
Taiwanese manufacturer, and the only issue remained in the lawsuit was
between the Taiwanese manufacturer and the Japanese component
manufacturer.83 All the justices thus concurred that the assumption of
jurisdiction in such a case would not be consistent with the “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”84
For general jurisdiction, the exact situations in which it would be
triggered were still unclear due to a lack of precedents by the Supreme
Court. Although the distinction between specific and general jurisdictions
was clearly adopted by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros, the plaintiff in
Helicopteros failed to find general jurisdiction.85 The lone case recognized
by the Supreme Court as an example of the exercise of general jurisdiction
was Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.86 However, the case is rather
dated and was decided before the formal adoption of general jurisdiction in
Helicopteros.
As a result, on June 27, 2011, the Supreme Court took the opportunity
to address these problems of specific and general jurisdictions in two
separate cases. First, the stream of commerce issue was discussed in
McIntyre.87 In that case, a worker was injured in New Jersey whilst
operating an allegedly defective machine manufactured by McIntyre UK, a
company incorporated and with its principle place of business in the UK.
The issue was whether the New Jersey court could exercise specific
jurisdiction over McIntyre UK, a company which did not have a branch nor
did business directly in New Jersey.88 In fact, all transactions, including the

La. 2012).
82. See id. at 845 (“although [the Japanese manufacturer] did not design or control the system of
distribution that carried its valve assemblies into [the forum], the [manufacturer] was aware of the
distribution system’s operation, and it knew that it would benefit economically from the sale in [the
forum] of products incorporating its components”).
83. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105.
84. Id. at 121.
85. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984) (finding that
helicopter purchases and purchase-linked activity in Texas were insufficient for the assumption of the
general jurisdiction against the defendant in Texas).
86. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (finding jurisdiction over a
Philippine corporation that managed its businesses in Ohio during the Japanese occupation of the
Philippine).
87. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2780.
88. Id. at 2786.
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transaction that brought the machine to New Jersey, were conducted
through a separate agent based in Ohio. This Ohio agent was authorized by
McIntyre America (hereinafter “McIntyre USA”) and served as the
exclusive U.S. distributor of McIntyre UK.89 Other than the sale through
McIntyre USA, the only relevant contacts of McIntyre UK consisted of (1)
the official of McIntyre UK participating in certain trade exhibitions in Las
Vegas, and (2) four machines manufactured by McIntyre UK ending up in
New Jersey. Using the stream of commerce metaphor, will the placement
of the McIntyre machines through the distribution by McIntyre USA in
Ohio and eventually reaching the ultimate user in New Jersey provide the
New Jersey court with specific jurisdiction?
Despite the intention to solve the “decades-old questions left open in
Asahi,”90 the Supreme Court once again failed to come to a consensus on
the issue. Four justices led by Justice Kennedy held firm to the stream of
commerce plus approach and rejected foreseeability on its own as a way of
satisfying the purposeful availment requirement for minimum contacts.91
On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg, in a strong dissenting opinion joined
by two other justices, criticized the plurality on a number of points,
including the plurality’s reliance on outdated doctrines of sovereignty and
implied consent.92 Of particular interest in the discussion of this article, she
found minimum contacts against McIntyre UK by highlighting, inter alia,
the role of McIntyre USA in McIntyre UK’s plan to penetrate the U.S.
market.93 However, specific jurisdiction was in the end denied since the
remaining two justices in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion simply
thought the assumption of jurisdiction would be inconsistent to established
precedents but did not agree with the plurality’s reasoning.94 Since the
justices failed to reach a majority judgment on stream of commerce, we are
left in the exact same position as prior to McIntyre. Lower courts that
previously adopted the stream of commerce approach have continued to do
so after McIntyre.95
89. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2796.
90. Id. at 2785.
91. See id. at 2788 (“as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that
its goods will reach the forum State”).
92. See id. at 2794–2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
93. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2796–2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 2794 (“I again reiterate that I would adhere strictly to our precedents and the limited
facts found by the New Jersey Supreme Court. And on those grounds, I do not think we can find
jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, though I agree with the plurality as to the outcome of this case, I
concur only in the judgment of that opinion and not its reasoning.”).
95. See, e.g., Chinese Mfg. Drywall Prods., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (“The Fifth Circuit has
unequivocally declared its adherence to Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Asahi and the stream-ofcommerce doctrine originated in World–Wide Volkswagen . . . . Thus, the Court must reject the
‘stream-of-commerce-plus’ approach to specific personal jurisdiction in favor of the less stringent
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As for general jurisdiction, its application was put to the test in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.96 In this case, two boys
were killed in a traffic accident outside Paris, France. Their parents
initiated an action in North Carolina against the subsidiaries of Goodyear in
Europe, alleging negligence in the manufacture of defective tires that
caused the injury.97 In contrast with the case in McIntyre, the action and
injury complained of in Goodyear had all happened in France98 and there
was clearly no application of specific jurisdiction.99 Instead, the plaintiff
argued that the defendants should be subject to the general jurisdiction of
the North Carolina court for placing their products in the stream of
commerce to North Carolina.100 The Supreme Court rejected this argument
as stream of commerce is confined to specific jurisdiction analysis.101 It
also took the opportunity to restate the general jurisdiction doctrine. Most
notably, the Court tried to confine the applicability of general jurisdiction
to the “home” of the defendant: “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum
for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly
regarded as at home [such as] place of incorporation, and principal place of
business.”102
The most significant point of the judgment for our purpose, however,
is the brief discussion of piercing the corporate veil as a potential
alternative to acquiring jurisdiction. As an alternative to the failed general
jurisdiction argument, the plaintiff sought to “pierce the corporate veil of
the European subsidiaries to impute the contacts of Goodyear to such
subsidiaries.”103 Unfortunately, the court regarded the plaintiff as having
forfeited the argument and did not discuss the viability nor substantive test

‘stream-of-commerce’ approach.”) (citations omitted).
96. Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2846.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2852 (“They have no place of business, employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina.
They do not design, manufacture, or advertise their products in North Carolina. And they do not solicit
business in North Carolina or themselves sell or ship tires to North Carolina customers.” The only direct
connection is “a small percentage of their tires . . . were distributed in North Carolina by other
Goodyear USA affiliates.”).
99. Id. (“Acknowledging that the claims neither “related to, nor . . . ar[o]se from, [petitioners’]
contacts with North Carolina,” the Court of Appeals confined its analysis to “general rather than
specific jurisdiction.”).
100. Id. at 2854–55.
101. Id. at 2855 (“Flow of a manufacturer’s products into the forum, we have explained, may
bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction. . . . But ties serving to bolster the exercise of
specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum has general
jurisdiction over a defendant.”).
102. Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2847.
103. Id. at 2857.
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of the jurisdictional piercing.104 The court, however, did not reject piercing
the corporate veil as a way that could potentially grant jurisdiction to the
forum.
Both Goodyear and McIntyre indicate the new problem the courts face
with corporate groups. It is true that the long arm jurisdiction established
under International Shoe allowed the courts to extend their jurisdiction
upstream to reach the out-of-state corporations, which either have directly
committed the conduct being complained about (specific jurisdiction), or
have directly conducted such a high volume of activities in the forum that
the relatedness thereof does not matter (general jurisdiction). However, the
out-of-state manufacturers could simply cut off the reach of the court by
setting up a separate subsidiary or agent downstream to handle its affairs in
the forum, such as the distribution of the goods. Using the stream of
commerce metaphor, setting up subsidiaries essentially builds a dam and
blocks the courts from tracing upstream. Whilst the deadlock in the stream
of commerce continues post-McIntyre, companies are encouraged to utilize
sophisticated corporate structures to avoid jurisdictional exposure.
By the same token, suing parent companies at their upstream “home”
is equally difficult. As Goodyear has shown even though Goodyear is
subject to general jurisdiction at its place of incorporation and principal
place of business, these fora are not considered as home for its out-of-state
subsidiaries. Whilst it is argued that the value of general jurisdiction is to
ensure that there will always be at least one forum in which a plaintiff can
sue,105 such alleged value can be substantially dissipated by simply having
the subsidiaries do the “dirty work” out of state.
In short, setting up intermediaries that are corporate could effectively
stop the plaintiff from pursuing the corporate parent either from the place
of act/injury through specific jurisdiction or from the place of
incorporation/principal place of business through general jurisdiction.
Thus, in the next Supreme Court case on jurisdiction, that of Daimler AG v.
Bauman,106 there was a bold attempt by the plaintiff to sidestep the
corporate structure through the use of the agency doctrine.
In Daimler, a number of Argentinians filed suits in California against
Daimler AG, a German company, for its violation of human rights in
Argentina during Argentina’s “Dirty War.”107 They claimed that California
had general jurisdiction over Daimler AG in two ways. First, there was
direct general jurisdiction over Daimler AG.108 Second, there was
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2857.
See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 665–66 (1988).
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 746.
Id. at 751.
Id. (“Plaintiffs invoked the court’s general or all-purpose jurisdiction. California, they urge, is
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jurisdiction under an agency theory. The jurisdictional contacts of
MBUSA, the subsidiary of Daimler AG in the United States with extensive
operations in California, are to be imputed to Daimler AG since MBUSA
has served as its agent in California.109 Both arguments failed. As for the
direct general jurisdiction based on Daimler AG’s own contacts with
California, this failed in the lower court.110 Thus, the focus of the case was
on the agency prong. Under the test approved by the Ninth Circuit, the
court should ask whether the subsidiary “performs services that are
sufficiently important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a
representative to perform them, the corporation’s own officials would
undertake to perform substantially similar services.”111
This was
considered by the Supreme Court to be too broad. If such a test were to be
adopted, “[a]nything a corporation does through an independent contractor,
subsidiary, or distributor is presumably something that the corporation
would do ‘by other means’ if the independent contractor, subsidiary, or
distributor did not exist.”112
Further, Justice Ginsburg was of the opinion that even if there was
found to be agency between MBUSA and Daimler AG, California still
could not be regarded as “home” to Daimler AG.113 Elaborating on the
“home” concept that she developed in Goodyear, Justice Ginsburg further
narrowed down the potential home that one can make of a corporation. She
emphasized that a home could not be found whenever “a foreign
corporation’s in forum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous
and systematic’”114 but that it must be “‘continuous and systematic’ as to
render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”115 Accordingly, general
jurisdiction does not apply because California is not the state of
incorporation nor the principal place of business for either MBUSA or
Daimler. It appears that being a large market for one’s products and having
substantial profits are not sufficient to satisfy the restated general
jurisdiction test of Justice Ginsburg.116
a place where Daimler may be sued on any and all claims against it, wherever in the world the claims
may arise.”).
109. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752 (“Alternatively, plaintiffs maintained that jurisdiction over Daimler
could be founded on the California contacts of MBUSA, a distinct corporate entity that, according to
plaintiffs, should be treated as Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional purposes.”).
110. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752 (“Daimler’s own affiliations with California, the court first
determined, were insufficient to support the exercise of all-purpose jurisdiction over the corporation.”).
111. Id. at 759.
112. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 759.
113. Id. 759–60.
114. Id. at 761.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 766–67 (“MBUSA’s California sales account for 2.4% of Daimler's worldwide sales . . .
in 2004, which . . . is $4.6 billion.”).
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Finally, on jurisdictional piercing, Justice Ginsburg recognized that
“several Courts of Appeals have held, that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional
contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated
by the latter as to be its alter ego.”117 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s
aforementioned agency test was “less rigorous” than the jurisdictional
piercing test. Unfortunately, since the jurisdictional piercing was never
raised in the proceedings, the Supreme Court again failed to make an
authoritative statement on the viability and substance of the doctrine.118
However, with the Supreme Court rejecting agency119 as the alternative
avenue in acquiring jurisdiction, the confusing status of stream of
commerce, and with Daimler further narrowing the possible home
available for general jurisdiction, jurisdictional piercing appears to be the
best hope for expanding the existing jurisdictional reach under due process.
Some lower courts have interpreted the treatment of jurisdictional
piercing under Goodyear and Daimler and have regarded both cases as
positive precedents for the doctrine. In Viega GmbH v. Eighth Jud. Dist.
Ct.,120 whilst acknowledging that Goodyear did not openly approve
jurisdictional piercing, the court was of the opinion that Goodyear had
“impl[ied],” but not “decid[ed],” that an alter ego theory would be
appropriate in such a situation.121 After Daimler was decided, the same
optimism was expressed in NYKCool A.B. v. Pacific Intern. Services, Inc.122
The court in that case stressed that alter ego, unlike agency, is the
appropriate theory in obtaining jurisdiction: “[t]he Court did not express
any doubt as to the soundness of an alter ego theory of jurisdiction, which
is present only in the rather different circumstance in which one person or
entity truly dominates another so that the two are indistinguishable for
practical purposes.”123
On the other hand, other courts took a more neutral stance and simply
regarded the new round of Supreme Court cases as not adding any
substance to the doctrine. For example, in In re Chinese Manufactured
Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig.,124 it was stated that “in the recent Supreme
Court cases addressing personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants the
Court either declined to address the imputation of minimum contacts
between affiliated corporate entities, the issue was not before the Court [in]

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 759.
Id. at 758.
At least as far as the version previously adopted by the Ninth Circuit.
Viega GmbH, 328 P.3d at 1152.
Id. at 1157.
NYKCool A.B. v. Pacific Intern. Services, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 385.
Id. at 393.
Chinese Mfg. Drywall Prods., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
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Goodyear.”125
While the law is not clear at this stage, the potential of jurisdictional
piercing may be illustrated by the three cases above. First, for general
jurisdiction, by disregarding the subsidiary’s corporate existence,
jurisdictional contacts might be attributed upstream from the subsidiary
(MBUSA) to the parent (Daimler AG) or downstream from the parent
(Goodyear) to the subsidiary (European subsidiaries). The upstream
attribution will not have the aforementioned issue of agency where the
agent’s home is not significant enough to be the principal’s home.126 This
is because jurisdictional piercing will make the parent and subsidiary one
entity for the purpose of general jurisdiction. The home of the subsidiary
will automatically be the home of the parent. For downstream attribution,
jurisdictional piercing also avoids the issue of whether the jurisdictional
contacts of the principal could be imputed to the agent.127 In the
terminology of liability piercing, this upstream attribution is regarded as
reverse piercing.128
Second, for specific jurisdiction, although the court did not even
mention piercing as a possible alternative in McIntyre, we can still see the
potential application of piercing the corporate veil in that very case.
Although McIntyre USA was not even a subsidiary and shareholding is
usually present in piercing the corporate veil, the majority of states allow
for piercing the corporate veil over unrelated companies, at least as far as
liability piercing is concerned.129 For these jurisdictions, shareholding is all
but one factor of the piercing question, the lack of which is not fatal to the
claim.130 New Jersey, the forum of the McIntyre case, happens to be one of
these jurisdictions.131 Thus, if the control exercised by McIntyre UK over

125. Chinese Mfg. Drywall Prods., 894 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (citation omitted).
126. See supra notes 114–115.
127. See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 20, at 19 (“it is more plausible to impute the contacts of
the agent to the principal than vice versa. Agents act on behalf of their principals, to whom their
activities are attributed. . . . Normally, . . . control is asymmetric, so that it will be easier to show
jurisdiction over the principal based upon the agent’s actions than the converse.”).
128. Admittedly, reverse piercing is not accepted in all states in liability piercing contexts. It is
noted, however, that the Supreme Court at least did not reject outright reverse piercing for jurisdictional
purposes. Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2846.
129. See Buckley v. Abuzir, 8 N.E. 3d 1166, 1172, 1176–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (“[O]ur research
shows that the majority of jurisdictions addressing this question allow veil-piercing against
nonshareholders . . . . In short, the weight of authority supports the conclusion that lack of shareholder
status — and, indeed, lack of status as an officer, director, or employee — does not preclude veilpiercing. Illinois falls in line with the majority.”).
130. See Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Constr. & Paving, Inc., 447 A.2d 406, 412 (Conn. 1982)
(“[S]tock ownership, while important, is not a prerequisite to piercing the corporate veil but is merely
one factor to be considered in evaluating the entire situation.”).
131. See Hettinger v. Kleinman, 733 F. Supp. 2d 421, 439 (S.D. N.Y. 2010) (finding that
nonshareholder status is not dispositive under New Jersey law).
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McIntyre USA was so extensive, there was a chance the two companies
could be regarded as one for the purpose of jurisdiction.
Looking closer at the lower court’s judgment, it seems that there was
substantial control applied by McIntyre UK over McIntyre USA:
[The correspondence between McIntyre UK and McIntyre
USA] support the reasonable inference that defendant
retained a significant measure of control over the level of
McIntyre America’s inventory of defendant’s machines,
which remained defendant’s property until McIntyre
America sold them to United States customers. It is also
reasonable to infer that defendant dictated the “margin” or
“commission” McIntyre America would receive when a sale
was accomplished. It is thus evident that the two companies
were acting closely in concert with each other to sell
defendant’s machines to customers throughout the United
States, through a distribution system in which McIntyre
America was a conduit for the sales.132
Whether this alleged control will be sufficient to pierce the corporate
veil of McIntyre UK remains unclear; it simply shows the possibility under
jurisdictional piercing. In the right case, piercing the corporate veil can
bridge the gap between the two divisions of the Supreme Court on stream
of commerce. The plus factors listed by Justice O’Connor are not
exhaustive.133 Exercising a level of excessive control that could amount to
piercing the corporate veil seems to be at least as good a plus factor as
designing or marketing the products in the forum.134
Potentials aside, the effectiveness of jurisdictional piercing still hinges
on the formulation of the courts. For example, if the forum in McIntyre
were Texas, the lack of shareholding between McIntyre UK and McIntyre
USA could be fatal as Texas law regards shareholding as essential in
piercing the corporate veil.135 A bird’s-eye view of the key precedents
shows highly fragmented approaches among different states, both in their
choice of law approaches as well as their attitudes toward adopting the test
of liability piercing for the purpose of jurisdictional piercing. These issues
are further analyzed in Section IV below.
132. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 945 A.2d 92, 97 (N.J. Sup. 2008).
133. See supra note 80.
134. Id.
135. See Bollore S.A. v. Import Warehouse, Inc., 448 F.3d 317, 325 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The great
weight of Texas precedent indicates that, for the alter ego doctrine to apply against an individual under
this test, the individual must own stock in the corporation.”).
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III. METHODOLOGY
A. PURPOSE OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The empirical research seeks to analyze all cases decided by the courts
in the United States for the three years beginning on January 1, 2012, and
ending on December 31, 2014. The purpose of the research is to survey the
actual practices of the courts in order to observe trends and tendencies that
could shed light on the answers to the four questions stated in the
introduction. In essence, it is to seek out those situations where
jurisdictional piercing is applicable and the actual test (both choice of law
and substantive test) adopted by the courts. It is hoped that constructive
proposals could be made after getting to know the full picture from this
survey. The full analysis will be set out in Section IV.
B. TIME PERIOD OF THE RESEARCH
As stated in Section II, the jurisdictional regime has entered another
stage of development, albeit a transitional one, since the Supreme Court
handed down the judgments of McIntyre and Goodyear in June 2011. This
empirical research focused on the recent cases decided since these two
judgments. The time period covered starts from 2012, the first full year
after McIntyre and Goodyear, and ends in 2014, the last full year at the
time of writing this article.
Whilst this time period admittedly does not account for the full history
of development of jurisdictional piercing, it does track the contemporary
developments of the doctrine more closely. As indicated in Section II,
jurisdictional piercing serves as an alternative to direct jurisdiction test
under minimum contacts. The development of the doctrine will therefore
inevitably be influenced by the shaping of the mainstream minimum
contacts doctrine. In addition, it is also expected that the mention of
jurisdictional piercing in Goodyear, and subsequently Daimler, would
inspire developments on jurisdictional piercing in lower courts. In this
sense, the research will reflect the current practices more closely and block
out unwanted noise from outdated information. It is believed that the three
full years from Goodyear and McIntyre will yield data of the highest
relevance and most predictive value.
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C. IDENTIFICATION OF RELEVANT CASES
The empirical research looks at three types of cases, namely, piercing
cases, conflict cases and jurisdictional cases.
1. Piercing Cases
These are cases that involve a form of piercing, including both
liability piercing and jurisdictional piercing. To qualify as a piercing case,
the court has to have been asked to decide on whether to pierce the
corporate veil in question. The only exceptions are the rare cases where the
courts decided on an important question related to piercing, yet were not
asked to make a decision at that stage of the proceedings. For example, a
case where the court simply decides the applicable law for piercing, i.e.,
choice of law question, for later proceedings is highly relevant to this
research and will be considered as a piercing case.136 Using the matrix of
Table 3 in Section IV, these piercing cases cover cases in Boxes 2, 3 and
4.137
These piercing cases are derived from a large pool of raw cases from
Westlaw that were found using the search phrases: “piercing the corporate
veil” and “disregard! corporate entity.”138 These search phrases are adopted
from Professor Robert Thompson’s seminal work on empirical research on
piercing the corporate veil (hereinafter “Thompson Study”)139 and have
been widely adopted in similar pieces of research, including a recent
empirical research on the applicable law of liability piercing cases
(hereinafter “Choice of Law Article”).140 However, it is acknowledged that
some key jurisdictional piercing cases in the past, for example Cannon,141
might not have used these key phrases in their judgments. Additional
searches on Westlaw were then conducted to identify cases that had cited
the following key cases over the three-year period:

136. E.g., in a case where the court was only asked to decide the governing law of the piercing issue
without deciding on whether the veil is to be pierced. That issue was left for trial. See Pac. Cycle, Inc.
v. PowerGroup Int’l, LLC, No. 12-cv-529-wmc, 2013 WL 5745692 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (“[The
defendant] has moved for an order clarifying whether this court will apply Wisconsin or Georgia law in
analyzing the question of alter ego liability.”).
137. See infra Section IV, Table 3.
138. See Thompson, supra note 13. Thompson also used four undisclosed key numbers.
139. Id.
140. See King Fung Tsang, Applicable Law in Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States: A
Choice With No Choice, 10 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 227 (2014).
141. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 333.
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Cannon142
Energy Reserve Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co.143
In re Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc.144

In total, 1,587 raw cases were derived from these searches. Each of
these raw cases was then reviewed one by one. To ensure the consistency
of the review process, all cases were reviewed and processed by the author
alone.
2. Conflict Cases
Conflict cases refer to those piercing cases that have a significant
relationship to more than one state.145 In other words, a conflict case must
be a piercing case. Common conflict cases include those involving an outof-state corporation and an out-of-state parent corporation. These are
generally regarded as diversity cases. Another common type are “federal
question” cases which means those cases that involve federal law.146 Other
cases include, for example, contract cases involving foreign governing law,
foreign place of performance or foreign laws and regulations. However,
the list is not exhaustive. The aforementioned methodology is identical to
the one used for the “Choice of Law Article.”147
The conflict cases are more important for the analysis than nonconflict piercing cases because they necessarily include the choice of law
issue. Conflict cases cover all cases in Boxes 3 and 4 in Table 3 in Section
IV,148 i.e. the jurisdictional cases; and part of the Box 2 cases, i.e., those
nonjurisdictional piercing cases with a conflict element.
3. Jurisdictional Cases
These are conflict cases that involve jurisdictional piercing. Due to
the involvement of an out-of-state parent or subsidiary, jurisdictional cases

142. Cannon, 267 U.S. at 333.
143. Energy Reserve Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978).
144. In re Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 985 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 (1971). This definition is derived from
section 2 of the Second Restatement (“Conflict of Laws is that part of the law of each state which
determines what effect is given to the fact that the case may have a significant relationship to more than
one state.”).
146. Note that while “diversity cases” and “federal question cases” used herein for the most parts
match with the respective definitions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, they are not
necessarily identical.
147. See Tsang, supra note 140, at 232–35.
148. See infra Section IV, Table 3.
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are necessarily conflict cases. These cases comprise cases in Box 3
(jurisdictional piercing cases with no liability piercing) and Box 4
(jurisdictional piercing cases with liability piercing) in Table 3 in Section
IV.149 All jurisdictional cases are conflict cases as well as piercing cases.
Needless to say, they constitute the most important cases for the empirical
research.
D. LIMITATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
As the research was conducted based purely on decided cases, it was
limited by selection bias, that is, “disputes selected for litigation (as
opposed to settlement) will constitute neither a random nor a representative
sample of the set of all disputes.”150 In addition, it must be emphasized
again that this research only covers the three latest full years and cannot be
regarded as giving a full account of all cases on jurisdictional piercing. To
provide a contrast with the recent data, data on procedural piercing in the
Thompson Study is used in this article.151 Whilst this article endeavors to
replicate the methodology of the Thompson Study, the data contained
therein is not individually verified by the author.
IV. THE QUESTIONS AND FINDINGS
There are four important questions to ask when it comes to
jurisdictional piercing:
1. In what situations is jurisdictional piercing generally applied?
a. What is the relationship between jurisdictional piercing and
liability piercing?
b. What is the relationship between jurisdictional piercing, agency
and direct jurisdiction?
2. How will jurisdictional piercing be applied?
a. Should state law or federal law govern the jurisdictional piercing
question? If it were state law, which state’s law?
b. Should the substantive test of jurisdictional piercing be the same
as that of liability piercing?

149. See infra Section IV, Table 3.
150. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4 (1984).
151. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 1060.
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After setting out the background and importance of these questions, the
answers derived from the findings from empirical research as described in
Section III are given.
Table 1 - Basic Findings, No. of cases
No. of
No. of
% of
piercing
conflict
conflict
cases
cases
cases in
piercing
cases

No. of
jurisdiction
piercing
cases

% of
jurisdiction
piercing
cases in
conflict
cases

2012

340

253

63.65%

44

17.39%

2013

348

265

76.15%

32

12.08%

2014

355

292

82.25%

29

9.93%

Total

1,043

810

77.66%

105

12.96%

The initial search in Westlaw yielded 1,587 cases of which 1,043 were
piercing cases. The large number of piercing cases demonstrates the
continued importance of piercing the corporate veil. For example,
compared with the Thompson Study, there were only a total of 484 cases
between 1980 and 1985.152 The annual number of piercing cases remained
stable, with a slight increase for each of the past two years.
Among the piercing cases, 810 cases are conflict cases, accounting for
77.66% of all piercing cases. This clearly shows that it is far more
common for a piercing case to be a conflict case than a purely domestic
one, and thus the significance of conflict of laws consideration in piercing
the corporate veil. With corporations preferring to incorporate in states like
Delaware and New York and doing business across the country, this is
hardly surprising. The percentage of conflict cases also continued to rise,
increasing from 63.65% of all piercing cases in 2012 to 82.25% in 2014.
There are 105 jurisdictional cases and these accounted for 10.67% and
12.96% of the piercing cases and conflict cases respectively. It is clear that
jurisdictional piercing happened much less often than liability piercing.
152. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 1048. Yet piercing the corporate veil was already regarded as
“the most litigated issue in corporate law.” See id. at 1037.
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However, with more than 100 cases relatively evenly distributed over three
years, they still represent a substantial amount and prove that jurisdictional
piercing is an established legal doctrine in contemporary jurisprudence. In
addition, comparing these with the jurisdictional piercing cases of the
Thompson Study, it should be apparent that there has been an increase in
jurisdictional piercing cases in the modern era. The Thompson Study only
has 141 jurisdictional cases up to 1985,153 just roughly four times the
number of cases in an average year covered by this research.
However, the significance of jurisdictional piercing cases goes beyond
the sheer number from both a jurisdictional and liability perspective. First,
as discussed in Section II, if the Supreme Court formally adopts piercing
the corporate veil as a way to establish jurisdiction and sets out the
substantive test, jurisdictional piercing will increase exponentially and open
up a whole new horizon for the jurisdictional regime. Second, in regard to
liability piercing, jurisdictional piercing successes is determinative to any
accompanying liability piercing. If the defendant successfully defeats
jurisdictional piercing, the courts will have no jurisdiction and hence no
authority to adjudicate on any liability piercing. Thus, success in
jurisdictional piercing essentially guarantees success in liability piercing.
However, jurisdictional piercing cases have been on the decline over
the past three years, from forty-four cases in 2012 to twenty-nine in 2014.
This is a rather interesting development, especially when both the number
of piercing cases and conflict cases increased during the same period. One
of the explanations could be the rejection of agency as an alternative way to
acquire jurisdiction in Daimler. Whilst the court was clear that it did not
reject jurisdictional piercing, both agency and jurisdictional piercing are a
kind of vicarious jurisdiction based on imputing the contacts of the instate’s subsidiary to the out-of-state parent.154 Rejecting agency, therefore,
could have a chilling effect on jurisdictional piercing on lower courts. That
said, this might not be the best explanation considering that the big drop in
jurisdictional piercing cases predated Daimler and started in 2013.
The chilling effect of Daimler might arguably be present in the drop in
piercing rate as shown below in Table 2.

153. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 1060.
154. See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 20, at 18–19.
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Table 2 - Piercing rate

2012

2013

2014

Total

Piercing
cases

Conflict
cases

Jurisdictional
cases

No. of
cases

340

253

44

Pierced
cases (%)

113
(33.24%)

91
(35.97%)

8
(18.18%)

No. of
cases

348

265

32

Pierced
cases (%)

133
(38.22%)

105
(39.6%)

15
(46.88%)

No. of
cases

355

292

29

Pierced
cases (%)

122
(34.37%)

102
(34.93)%

8
(27.59%)

No. of
cases

1,043

810

105

Pierced
cases (%)

368
(35.28%)

298
(36.79%)

31
(29.52%)

The piercing rate for the piercing cases covered in the research is
35.28%, lower than the 40.18% in the Thompson Study. However, while
the relevant piercing rates of conflict cases is similar, at 36.79%, the
piercing rate for jurisdictional piercing cases dropped significantly to just
29.52%. This indicates a substantially bigger challenge to piercing the
corporate veil in jurisdictional piercing cases. This difference in piercing
rates between general piercing cases and jurisdictional piercing cases is
also observed in the Thompson Study. The jurisdictional piercing rate
there is 36.88% compared with an overall 40.18% of all cases.155 The

155. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 1060.
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jurisdictional piercing rate of the Thompson Study is higher than the one
here but so is the difference between the two studies in overall piercing
rate.
The piercing rate dropped from 46.88% in 2013 to 29.52% in 2014.
Considering that Daimler was decided in January 2014, one could attribute
the drop in 2014 almost entirely to Daimler. However, the data is limited
to just one year in 2014. In addition, we can see that the piercing rate of
2014 is still higher than that of 2012. An argument, therefore, can be made
that the 2013 high piercing rate might be just an outlier instead. Further,
very few cases covered in the research actually cited Goodyear or Daimler.
Particularly with regard to Daimler and those jurisdictional piercing cases
that have cited Daimler are generally positive on its impact on
jurisdictional piercing,156 it will be interesting to see if the low piercing rate
and drop in jurisdictional piercing cases continue.
A. QUESTION 1 – WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JURISDICTIONAL
PIERCING AND LIABILITY PIERCING?
Normally, there will be two related companies. As mentioned earlier
in the discussion of McIntyre, they do not necessarily need to have a
shareholding of one another.157 These will be termed “C1” and “C2”
hereinafter. Since the purpose of jurisdictional piercing is to impute
jurisdictional contacts from one entity to another, generally only one of
them will be subject to the jurisdiction of the forum but not the other. The
same goes with liability and we will assume for the purpose of discussion
that only one entity is liable or subject to the forum’s direct jurisdiction. In
addition, one related question is whether the jurisdictional piercing is raised
alongside traditional liability piercing. Jurisdictional piercing might be
raised together with liability piercing or they might each be raised
respectively and independent of each other. Having regard to the above
considerations, the exposure of C1 in terms of liability and/or jurisdiction
based on its relationship with C2 can be presented in four possible
scenarios:

156. See supra note 9.
157. See Hettinger v. Kleinman, 733 F. Supp. 2d 421, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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Table 3 - Interactions between jurisdictional piercing and liability
piercing158
C1 under forum’s
C2 under forum’s
jurisdiction
jurisdiction
C1 liable

No JP, No LP

1
C2 liable

No JP but LP – 938
cases with piercing rate
of 35.93% (conflict 705
cases; non-conflict 233
cases)
4

JP but no LP – 80 cases
with piercing rate of
26.25%
2
JP & LP - 25 cases with
JP piercing rate of 40%
and LP piercing rate of
28%
3

The first thing to note from Table 3 is that jurisdictional piercing and
liability piercing might not coincide in any given case. Based on the
framework in Table 3, we are interested in finding out the answers to the
following subquestions:



How are piercing cases distributed among Boxes 2, 3 and 4?
How does a case falling into these boxes affect the success
rate of piercing?

Each of the four scenarios will be discussed in detail below. Box 1
represents the situation where neither type of piercing is required. In that
scenario, C1 (assuming to be the company with assets to satisfy potential
judgment) is the only company that committed the act that is complained of
and so liability piercing is not triggered. There is also no need to apply
jurisdictional piercing since C1 is subject to the direct jurisdiction of the
court. This direct jurisdiction can be either general or specific. For
example, if C1 is incorporated in New Jersey, it will be subject to the
jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts. On the other hand, C2, the related

158. The purpose of the table used here and that of Brilmayer and Paisley’s article are different.
Their table mainly discusses relationship between jurisdictional piercing and agency. See Brilmayer &
Paisley, supra note 20, at 9.
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company, does not enter into the picture either on jurisdiction or liability.
Since Box 1 does not involve either type of piercing, it is not a scenario
that this article is concerned with and the number of such cases is not
known.
In Box 2, there are eighty cases, accounting for just 7.67% of all
piercing cases. However, the majority of these are jurisdictional piercing
cases, representing 76.19% thereof.
Here, the plaintiff resorts to
jurisdictional piercing against C1 but does not require liability piercing. If
the plaintiff were to pursue jurisdictional piercing against McIntyre UK as
we have discussed hypothetically in Section II, it will fit into Box 2. Since
the plaintiff only pursued McIntyre UK for products-liability directly, there
is no need to conduct liability piercing between McIntyre UK and McIntyre
USA.159 The plaintiff would also have no intention to make it shoulder the
potential liability of McIntyre UK anyway since McIntyre USA had been
made bankrupt by the time of the lawsuit.160
In connection with jurisdiction, since we know that the Supreme Court
ultimately rejected the stream of commerce theory, direct jurisdiction over
McIntyre UK could not be obtained. Instead, assuming that the control
exerted by McIntyre UK over McIntyre USA was excessive and
legitimate,161 jurisdictional piercing could serve as a potential avenue to
make McIntyre UK subject to the jurisdiction of the New Jersey court.
The piercing rate of Box 2 cases is 26.25%, slightly lower but still in
line with the piercing rate of all jurisdictional cases of 29.52%.
There are twenty-five cases in Box 3. Box 3 requires both types of
piercing as represented by the darkest shading in Table 3 above. Assuming
now that McIntyre UK was just a holding company based in England, and
the defective machine was manufactured and sold by McIntyre USA, it will
be necessary for the plaintiff to pursue both jurisdictional and liability
piercing. Technically, these are two separate exercises. Depending on the
respective tests under jurisdictional piercing and liability piercing, it is
possible that piercing might be successful regarding jurisdictional piercing
but not liability piercing.162 For example, if the court applies a more lenient
standard for the jurisdictional piercing, the plaintiff might be successful in
requiring the defendant to defend the lawsuit in New Jersey. However,

159. McIntyre is a products-liability case against the manufacturer, McIntyre UK. McIntyre USA,
the distributor, was not a defendant in the case as it had been bankrupt at the time of the proceeding.
See Nicastro, 945 A.2d at 97 (N.J. Super. 2008) (“McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd . . . was
defendant’s exclusive distributor in the United States prior to going bankrupt in 2001.”).
160. Id.
161. See id. at 108.
162. Of course, if the tests for the two types of piercing are the same, one might argue for only
needing one exercise of piercing for both purposes.
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should the court apply a more demanding standard on liability piercing, the
case will still fail and leave the plaintiff without any compensation.163
Since each of the cases in Box 3 has two sets of piercing, there are two
piercing rates. The piercing rate of jurisdictional piercing in Box 3 is 40%
which compares to just 26.25% in Box 2. Thus, the observation is that the
courts are more likely to pierce the corporate veil in a jurisdictional context
when liability piercing is raised in the same case. However, any strategic
benefits gained by the plaintiff are moot since the liability piercing rate of
Box 3 cases is 28%, not far from the 26.25% of the Box 2 jurisdictional
piercing. From the perspective of the defendant, as long as one of the two
piercings is successful, it will not be liable. This might explain the small
number of cases involving both jurisdictional and liability piercing in Box
3. As we will see below, this will have an impact on our analysis of the test
of jurisdictional piercing.164
Finally, there are 938 cases in Box 4 with a piercing rate of 35.93%.
Breaking it down further, there are 705 and 233 conflict cases and
nonconflict cases respectively. Box 4 is the opposite of Box 2. There is no
need for jurisdictional piercing, but a need for liability piercing. Further,
changing the facts of McIntyre could help illustrate this case. It is assumed
first that McIntyre UK and McIntyre USA were both New Jersey
corporations and, second, that McIntyre USA was the business unit that
manufactured the machine with McIntyre UK being a holding company.
For the plaintiff to get any financial compensation, he will have to pierce
the corporate veil of McIntyre USA in order to reach McIntyre UK since
McIntyre USA is bankrupt. On the other hand, since both corporations are
subject to the general jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts, there will be no
need for jurisdictional piercing. This case did not involve jurisdictional
piercing nor did it involve conflict of laws. Everything happened in New
Jersey and all parties were based in New Jersey.165
Having regard to the above, it appears that we are most interested in
Boxes 2 and 3, as both involve jurisdictional piercing. However, cases
covered in Box 4 could still be relevant even if they only involve liability
piercing. This is because a large percentage of jurisdictional piercing cases
163. The reverse case, that is, success in liability piercing and failure in jurisdictional piercing, is
more difficult to comprehend. If the plaintiff fails jurisdictional piercing in the first place, the court will
be without jurisdiction to adjudicate the liability issue.
164. See infra note 173.
165. However, it is possible to have a conflict of law case affecting liability piercing, but does not
involve jurisdictional piercing. For example, if we keep McIntyre USA as an Ohio corporation, there
will still be general jurisdiction over McIntyre UK, and hence no need for jurisdictional piercing. But
in terms of which law governs the liability piercing issue, there will be a choice of law issue. The court
may have to decide whether to apply Ohio law, the state of incorporation of McIntyre USA, or New
Jersey law, the law of forum.
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actually borrow their tests from liability piercing as we will see in the
discussion of Question 3 below.166
B. QUESTION 2–WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JURISDICTIONAL
PIERCING, AGENCY AND DIRECT JURISDICTION?
As Daimler has shown,167 plaintiffs often endeavor to acquire
jurisdiction over the out-of-state parent by both direct jurisdiction (either
general or specific) and by other forms of vicarious jurisdiction (agency
and/or jurisdictional piercing). Question 2 explores the relationship
between direct jurisdiction and jurisdictional piercing. The following subquestions are derived from the framework in Table 3:



Are the jurisdictional piercing claims accompanied by a direct
jurisdiction claim under traditional minimum contacts theory
and/or agency?
How does the availability of direct jurisdiction claim affect
the piercing rate?

Both Questions 1 and 2 are important because they could affect the
plaintiff’s strategic decision in formulating his/her jurisdictional piercing
argument.

166. One could also argue that liability piercing is per se relevant to jurisdictional piercing, since
piercing is a concept that originated from liability piercing.
167. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
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Table 4 - Relationship with direct jurisdiction and agency
Jurisdictional
piercing only

Jurisdictional
piercing with
direct
jurisdiction

Jurisdictional
piercing with
agency

Jurisdictional
piercing with
direct
jurisdiction
and agency

No. of
cases

42

45

4

10

Piercing
cases

18

8

2

2

Piercing
rate

42.86%

17.78%

50%

20%

Cases with 42
jurisdiction

10

2

3

42.86%
Success
rate of
finding
jurisdiction

22.22%

50%

30%

Table 4 shows the extent of the impact on the piercing rate of both
finding piercing and jurisdiction by having a direct jurisdiction discussion
under the minimum contacts test and/or agency in the same case. All
jurisdictional cases are divided into the four categories in Table 4 based on
the type of jurisdictional discussions by the court in each case. For the
interests of the plaintiff, it does not matter under what basis the court
acquires jurisdiction against the defendant as long as one of the bases
succeeds. Accordingly, apart from showing the jurisdictional piercing rates
under each category, the overall success rates of finding jurisdiction are
also included. The distribution of simple jurisdictional piercing cases and
those with additional arguments are about even, with forty-two simple
cases and sixty-nine cases with additional arguments.
There are two interesting findings from Table 4. First, one may have
assumed that arguing for multiple bases of jurisdiction will increase the
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chances of success in finding jurisdiction. That is true but only to a very
limited extent. The additional arguments only amount to three more
successful cases in finding jurisdiction among the three categories with
additional arguments, namely, two and one for raising additional arguments
of direct jurisdiction and agency/direct jurisdiction.
Second, simple jurisdictional piercing cases with no additional
arguments have a much higher success rate. Compared with the ultimate
jurisdiction success rate of the other three categories combined together,
simple jurisdictional piercing cases have a 42.86% piercing rate, more than
just 25.42% of the combined categories. In addition, it is also higher than
the general piercing rate of all jurisdictional cases (29.52%).
The best explanation for this is probably that the courts do not need to
analyze other grounds for jurisdiction when there is a successful and
winning argument in jurisdictional piercing. On the contrary, if the
jurisdictional piercing argument is weak, both the plaintiff and the court
will need to analyze the other bases. Whilst these additional bases may
help at times, they are not generally sufficient to save a weak case. In
conclusion, more than anything, the additional bases for jurisdiction are
just signs of weakness in the jurisdictional piercing claim. Like raising
liability piercing in the same case, more may not be better when it comes to
jurisdictional piercing.
C. QUESTION 3 – SHOULD STATE LAW OR FEDERAL LAW GOVERN THE
JURISDICTIONAL PIERCING QUESTION? IF IT WERE STATE LAW, WHICH
STATE’S LAW?
The third question is in essence a choice of law question. Here, there
are two levels of considerations. First, when a state court168 is faced with a
jurisdictional piercing question, does it have authority to decide the
governing law? In other words, if jurisdictional piercing, like liability
piercing,169 is a state law matter, the states will be free to adopt their own
governing law. However, if jurisdictional piercing, perhaps because of its
strong connection and significant impact on jurisdiction, is a federal law
matter, then the state courts will have no choice but to apply federal law.
Second, if jurisdictional piercing is a state law matter, the next level of
consideration is which state’s jurisdictional piercing law will the state
168. For the purposes of this article, federal courts sitting in diversity cases are also regarded as
state courts.
169. See Tsang, supra note 140, at 227–28. Liability piercing is largely a corporate law matter,
though it is possible for state courts to apply federal common law, especially for liability piercing
relating to federal statutes. However, the application of federal common law in liability piercing is
more a choice by the respective state courts than a federal mandate. Id. at 257–58.
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courts apply. If liability piercing is any indicator, it has been found that the
choice of law approaches of state courts vary.170 Whilst it was widely
believed that liability piercing applies the law of the state of
incorporation,171 a previous survey indicates that it is more of a mixed bag
with the law of forum being a much more popular choice in practice as far
as liability piercing is concerned.172 It will be interesting to see whether the
choice of law approach in jurisdictional piercing resembles that of liability
piercing.
Table 5 - Choice of law between state and federal laws
State
Federal
No. of cases

86

19

Pierced cases

25

6

Piercing rate

29.07%

31.58%

The first thing to notice is the predominant number of cases applying
state law. This means that most courts in the United States view the choice
of law question as one that is in the domain of the states. There are only
eighteen cases that applied federal law. That indicates that only 18.10% of
courts believe there could be only one federal test for jurisdictional
piercing. Thus, it is obvious that there are clear preference in adopting
state law. The convenience and familiarity could be a big factor, especially
in cases where both jurisdictional and piercing issues have been raised in
the same case. As we have seen though, the number of these cases is not as
sizeable as one might have thought.173
It can also be argued that the states should make a decision as to
which law to apply having regard to the current jurisdictional regime. As
discussed in Section II, the jurisdictional analysis is a two-prong analysis
involving first the minimum contacts test under International Shoe and
second the state long arm statute.174 In order to establish jurisdiction,
theoretically, all courts must satisfy both prongs.175 Whilst the majority of
states collapse these two prongs into one when they interpret the reach of
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See Tsang, supra note 140, at 253.
See id. at 227–28.
See id. at 254.
Less than one-fourth of all jurisdictional cases. See supra Table 3.
See Young, 315 F.3d at 261.
Id.
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their long arm statutes to the maximum extent allowed under minimum
contacts,176 it is a choice of the state and one cannot deny the fact that states
are stakeholders in the exercise of jurisdiction. As shown in Table 6 below,
jurisdictional piercing was discussed by the courts in 21.90% of cases when
the courts were solely considering the state’s long-arm statute and not in
the discussion of the federal due process issue.
Table 6 - Stages at which jurisdictional piercing is considered
23 (21.90%)
State long-arm statute
Due process: general & specific

1 (0.95%)

Due process: general

10 (9.52%)

Due process: specific

19 (18.10%)

Due process: unclear

30 (28.57%)

Unclear

22 (20.95%)

Total

105 (100%)

Second, it is perhaps more important to understand how the rule of
jurisdictional piercing, as decided by a state, could be consistent with
minimum contacts as Section II discusses how minimum contacts test has
become the gold standard of jurisdictional analysis since International
Shoe. With minimum contacts being a federal standard based on the
interpretation of the due process clause, it seems at first glance that it will
not be compatible with the state jurisdictional piercing standard. However,
the key to reconciling the two lies in the nature of jurisdictional piercing.
As explained by the court in Great American Duck Races, Inc. v.
Intellectual Solutions, Inc.,177 “[t]he theory behind finding personal
jurisdiction in such alter-ego situations is that, because the corporation and
individual are considered to be the same entity, the jurisdictional contacts
of one are the jurisdictional contacts of the other for purposes of the due
process analysis.”178 In other words, instead of providing a separate and

176. See Young, 315 F.3d at 261.
177. Great Am. Duck Races, Inc. v. Intell. Solutions, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00436 JWS, 2013 WL
1092990, at *1 (Ariz. D. Mar. 15, 2013).
178. Id. at *2.
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competitive standard like the now faded theory of “presence,” jurisdictional
piercing simply works to interpret who is the person/entity that is subject to
the standard of minimum contacts. Jurisdictional piercing, therefore, works
with minimum contacts instead of trying to bypass it. Accordingly, a
number of courts have endorsed the compatibility of jurisdictional piercing
and due process:
Federal courts that have considered the issue conclude that it
is compatible with due process for a court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over an individual . . . that would not
ordinarily be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court
when the individual . . . is an alter ego . . . of a corporation
that would be subject to personal jurisdiction in that court.179
A corporation is a creature of state law180 and so it makes sense for the
states to define what it is, including when such artificial existence is to be
disregarded. As Brilmayer and Paisley argue, “[t]he substantive relations
that enter into due process calculations are primarily a matter of the law
that creates the cause of action, usually state law. The due process clause
does not itself create notions of agency, conspiracy, and the like.”181
Accordingly, it can be argued that on the choice of law question, a state
retains the authority to decide which is the test to apply for jurisdiction as
much as for liability.
Once it is established that the states have autonomy on the choice of
law question, it is up to each state to find out for itself the choice of law
rule it prefers, much like liability piercing. To some states, that means the
law of the state of incorporation.182 For others, it may be the law of the
forum.183
179. Great Am. Duck Races, 2013 WL 1092990, at *2; see also Pro Tanks v. Midwest Propane &
Refined Fuels, LLC, 988 F. Supp. 2d 772, 781 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (“This Court believes when the unique
circumstances for a corporate veil piercing and/or alter ego determination are met the proper question is
not whether the parent has minimum contacts with a jurisdiction. To the contrary, the proper question
is whether the parent and/or the subsidiary have minimum contacts, because the parent is essentially
one in the same with the subsidiary—it is its ‘alter ego.’”) (emphasis original).
180. See Soviet Pan Am. Travel Effort v. Travel Comm., Inc., 756 F. Supp. 126, 131 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (“Because a corporation is a creature of state law whose primary purpose is to insulate
shareholders from legal liability, the state of incorporation has the greater interest in determining when
and if that insulation is to be stripped away.”).
181. See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 20, at 25.
182. See John Guidry v. Seven Trails West, LLC, No. 4:12CV1652 FRB, 2013 WL 1883192, at *1,
*5 (E.D. Mo. D. May 6, 2013) (“Such assertion of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant
. . . is contingent upon the ability of the plaintiffs to pierce the corporate veil. The law of the state of
incorporation determines whether and how to pierce the corporate veil.”).
183. See Estate of Thomson ex rel. Estate of Rakestraw v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545
F.3d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 2008) (“In applying the alter-ego theory of personal jurisdiction in this diversity
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Due to the fact that, essentially, most states view jurisdictional
piercing cases as a state law matter, this makes the next choice of law
question — which state’s law governs the jurisdictional piercing — even
more important. Table 7 sets out the different approaches adopted to
decide that question:
Table 7 - State’s choice of law approach
Approaches
Jurisdictional Percentage of
piercing (state jurisdictional
law)
cases

Conflict
cases184

Percentage
of conflict
cases

Law of
incorporation
of subsidiary

7

8.14%

102

12.59%

Law of
incorporation
of parent

1

1.16%

4

0.49%

Law of forum

11

12.79%

45

5.56%

Law of
underlying
claim

2

2.33%

41

5.06%

Interest
analysis

1

1.16%

2

0.25%

Law with the
most
significant
relationship

0

0%

11

1.36%

No specified
approaches

60

69.77%

531

65.56%

Same

2

2.33%

45

5.56%

action, we must look to Ohio law.”).
184. Since nonconflict cases have no choice of law concern, they are excluded from this analysis.
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(Table 7 continued- State’s choice of law approach)
Consent
2
2.33%
28

3.46%

Others

0

0

1

0.12%

Total no. of
conflict
cases

86

100%

810

100%

The point that stands out most from Table 7 is not that a particular
approach dominates the states’ choice of law approaches, but that none
does. The majority of cases have no choice of law analyses applied thereto
during the adjudication process. 69.77% of jurisdictional piercing cases
that applied state laws have not gone through choice of law analysis. This
is similar to the high percentage of general conflict cases (65.56%) that did
not do the same. It is therefore more important to look at the law actually
applied by the courts, including the majority cases where there was no
choice of law analyses.
Table 8 - Application of forum law
Jurisdictional piercing
(state law)

Conflict cases

Applied forum law

73

687

Percentage of forum
law application

84.88%

84.81%

Applied non-forum
law

13

123

Percentage of nonforum law
application

15.12%

15.19%

Total cases

86

810

It is clear from Table 8 that, like liability piercing cases, jurisdictional
piercing cases essentially have the law of the forum applied to them at the
end, whether there is choice of law analysis or not. The most significant
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differences between the two categories of cases are that jurisdictional
piercing prefers law of the forum even more, accounting for 12.79% of
jurisdictional piercing cases compared with just 5.56% of conflict cases;
and has even less reliance on the law of the state of incorporation,
accounting for only 8.14% of jurisdictional piercing cases compared with
12.59% of conflict cases (see Table 7). This is probably due to the much
stronger connection and interest that the jurisdiction has with the forum.
Unlike liability piercing, where the focus is between the parties, the
emphasis on a relationship between a forum and the defendant seems to
have a significant impact on the courts’ choice of law approach.
D. QUESTION 4 – SHOULD THE SUBSTANTIVE TEST OF JURISDICTIONAL
PIERCING BE THE SAME AS THAT OF LIABILITY PIERCING?
The fourth question asks what the substantive test should look like.
Should it just be identical to the traditional corporate law tests adopted in
liability piercing? Or should there be a specifically designed test
customized for the purpose of jurisdictional piercing?
Traditionally, piercing the corporate veil is a liability concept.
According to Professor Frederick Powell, the most common test used for
liability piercing consists of a three-prong test: (1) excessive control, (2)
fraud or injustice and (3) proximity to injury.185
Although the actual tests applied by the states vary, they are,
nonetheless, mainly a mixing and matching of the two key components:
control and fraud.186 Generally, both components are required but there are
also cases where they are used in a disjunctive sense.187 On the other hand,
should jurisdictional piercing have its own test? How relevant should
elements of control and fraud play in this jurisdictional specific formula?
The relationship between jurisdictional piercing and liability piercing as
discussed in Question 1 is therefore highly relevant.

185. See FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF A
PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY (1931).
186. See Tsang, supra note 140, at 245.
187. Id.
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Table 9 - Liability test vs. jurisdictional specific test188
Jurisdictional specific
Liability test
test
Number of cases

37

64

Number of pierced
cases

13

19

Piercing rate

35.14%

29.69%

The majority of jurisdictional cases have adopted the same liability
test instead of creating a jurisdictional specific test. Further, in Table 9, the
piercing rate of liability test (29.69%) is almost identical to the general
piercing rate of the jurisdictional piercing (29.52%). However, the
jurisdictional specific test has a much higher piercing rate than both the
liability test and the general piercing test (35.28%). The reason for this
discrepancy seems to be the treatment of fraud element.
It has been argued that the test for jurisdictional piercing should not be
as demanding as liability piercing. In Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v.
Miller,189 it was said that “[u]nlike piercing the corporate veil, it is not
necessary to show “that the shell was used to commit a fraud.”190
Alternatively, courts have said that either establishing excessive control or
fraud can succeed for jurisdictional piercing. For example, in Int’l Equity
Invs., Inc. v. Opportunity Equity Partners, Ltd.,191 Justice Kaplan was of the
opinion that the control factor alone could be sufficient for jurisdictional
piercing:
New York law allows the corporate veil to be pierced either
when there is fraud or when the corporation has been used as
an alter ego. The latter normally requires a showing of . . .
complete control by the dominating corporation that leads to
a wrong against third parties. But this standard is relaxed
where the alter ego theory is used not to impose liability, but
merely to establish jurisdiction. In such an instance, the
188. There are only 101 cases in the Table. This is because there are four cases that did not actually
specify the test.
189. Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1981).
190. Id. at 904.
191. Int’l Equity Invs., Inc. v. Opportunity Equity Partners, Ltd., 475 F. Supp. 2d 456, 458
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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question is only whether the allegedly controlled entity was a
shell for the allegedly controlling party; it is not necessary to
show also that the shell was used to commit a fraud.192
A piercing test that only needs to satisfy one factor (control) is clearly
much easier for the plaintiff than one with two factors (control and fraud).
This more lenient approach is reflected in those cases that have applied the
jurisdictional specific test.
Table 10 - Reason for failure in jurisdictional piercing
Jurisdictional
Liability test
specific test

Total

Control, fraud
and proximity
Control and
fraud
Just fraud

0 (0.00%)

1 (2.22%)

1 (1.45%)

1 (4.17%)

14 (31.11%)

15 (21.74%)

2 (8.33%)

7 (15.56%)

9 (13.04%)

Just control

18 (75.00%)

13 (28.89%)

31 (44.93%)

Insufficient
facts
No application

0 (0.00%)

6 (13.33%)

6 (8.70%)

3 (12.5%)

4 (8.89%)

7 (10.14%)

Total

24 (100.00%)

45 (100.00%)

69 (100.00%)

Table 10 shows the reason why piercing failed according to the courts.
There are sixty-nine failed piercing cases where the courts had set forth the
jurisdictional piercing tests. These cases are further divided between those
that adopted a jurisdictional specific test and a liability test. Fraud is a
factor for 48.89%193 of cases adopting a liability test while only accounting
for 12.5% of cases adopting a jurisdictional specific test. Cases that failed
entirely due to the lack of fraud account for 15.56% of liability test cases
although only 8.33% of jurisdictional specific test cases. In addition, even
if same factors are to be considered for both tests, there are suggestions that
they should be considered under a more lenient standard in a jurisdictional
192. Equity Partners, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 459 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis original).
193. Calculated by combining the categories of “Control, Fraud and Proximity,” “Control and
Fraud,” and “Fraud only” in the Liability piercing column.
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context rather than a liability context.194
Having discussed the more lenient standard found in the jurisdictional
specific test, the question is why there should be a different standard from
liability piercing and how having a lower standard can be justified. It is
first necessary to consider the differences between the purposes of the two
types of piercing. The purpose of jurisdictional piercing is to make the
parent company subject to the jurisdiction of the forum whereas the
purpose of liability piercing is to make it subject to the debt of the
subsidiary. The former asks whether it is fair to require the out-of-state
defendant to travel to the forum to defend itself195 while the latter asks
whether it is fair for the shareholder to be responsible for the liability of the
company.196 In other words, one examines “the relationship between the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation,”197 and the other examines the
relationship between the shareholder and company (the control factor)198 as
well as the relationship between the shareholder and plaintiff (the fraud
factor).199 This point is succinctly presented by Professor Blumberg:
“[b]ecause the powerful influence of limited liability, creating additional
pressures opposed to any attribution of substantive liability, is entirely
absent in the case of amenability to jurisdiction, one might suppose that
more relaxed standards of piercing would apply.”200
Simply put, jurisdictional piercing aims to make the shareholder come
to the forum; it is several steps away from making it liable for the liability
of the company. Under this approach, for cases where both piercings are
alleged by the plaintiff, it remains a two-prong process: first a more lenient
standard for jurisdictional piercing, followed by a more stringent liability
piercing.
By combining the two variables under Questions 3 and 4, we can
derive four categories of potential test to be adopted for jurisdictional
194. See Miramax Film Corp. v. Abraham, No. 01-CV-5202(GBD), 2003 WL 22832384, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003) (“The standard for piercing the corporate veil for purposes of obtaining
jurisdiction is a less stringent one.”).
195. See International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (Ultimately, International Shoe asks whether there
exist minimum contacts that will satisfy “traditional notion of fair play and substantive justice.”).
196. See Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“In general, federal courts
accord separate corporate entities great deference and will disregard the corporate form only in limited
circumstances ‘when the incentive value of limited liability is outweighed by the competing value of
basic fairness to parties dealing with the corporation.’”).
197. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (“[T]he relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation . . . became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”).
198. See Gieseke ex rel. Diversified Water Diversion, Inc. v. IDCA, Inc., 826 N.W.2d 816, 830
(Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (“The first prong of the test focuses on the shareholder’s relationship to the
corporation.”).
199. Id. at 831 (“The second prong of the test examines the relationship of the plaintiff to the
corporation.”).
200. See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at § 25.05[A].
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piercing. These are set out in Table 11.
Table 11 - Possible jurisdictional tests
State law
Liability test

Jurisdiction specific
test

60 cases with piercing
rate of 26.67%

Federal law
4 cases with piercing
rate: 25%

1

3

23 cases with piercing
rate of 43.48%

14 cases with piercing
rate of 21.43%

2

4

Each of the four categories will be examined in more detail below.
1. Category 1
Courts adopting the approach of Category 1 essentially handle
jurisdictional piercing the same way they do liability piercing both in terms
of choice of law and the substantive test. Since jurisdictional piercing
borrows the concept from liability piercing and applies it to the
jurisdictional context,201 it is not surprising that courts will simply apply the
same test to both the choice of law question and the substantive test.
First, on the choice of law question, it can be argued that the states
should make the decision as to which law to apply having regard to the
current jurisdictional regime.
The argument is that if a parent company is found by the court to have
exercised such dominance and excessive control over its subsidiary to
defraud the plaintiff or otherwise subject him/her to injustice, there is no
reason why that parent company should not be regarded as the same entity
as the subsidiary for both the purposes of liability and jurisdiction.202
Following this approach, the jurisdictional piercing and liability piercing
201. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
202. See Cardell Fin. Corp. v. Suchodolski Assocs., No. 09 Civ. 6148, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
188295, at *47–48 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2012) (“On an alter-ego claim for liability, the corporate veil will
be pierced if a plaintiff can demonstrate that ‘the alleged dominating party exercised complete
domination over the corporation with respect to the subject transaction and that such domination was
used to commit a fraud or other wrong which injured [the] plaintiff.’”).
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will effectively be merged into one piercing for those cases alleging both
piercing. Thus, if the court accepts a plaintiff’s jurisdictional piercing
claim, there will be no need to undergo the same piercing test for a liability
purpose.203
The data in Table 11 are clearly a huge vote of confidence in the
approach of Category 1. This is not surprising considering that liability
cases are the mainstay of the piercing regime. When jurisdictional piercing
only accounts for less than one-tenth of all piercing cases, it is expected
that courts may be influenced by the more traditional liability piercing and
simply use the same test for both purposes. This is also reflected by the
lack of in-depth analysis why Category 1 is to be adopted among cases
choosing the Category 1 approach.
Epps v. Stewart Information Services Corp.204 is an example of a
Category 1 approach and is one of the most cited cases on jurisdictional
piercing decided by the Court of Appeal of the Eighth Circuit.205 The case
involved a class-action against a nonresident holding company based on the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and the defendant sought to dismiss
the case due to the lack of personal jurisdiction. In this case, the defendant
was the only named defendant in the suit and there was no issue of liability
piercing.206 In addition, the defendant was incorporated in Delaware, had
no place of business in Arkansas, was not authorized to do business in
Arkansas and had no direct contact with Arkansas other than being the
shareholder of two Arkansas subsidiaries.
After holding that there was no specific jurisdiction over the
defendant, the court considered whether there could be general jurisdiction
based on the contacts of the Arkansas subsidiaries. Positively affirming the
role of jurisdictional piercing, the court said that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction
can be properly asserted over a corporation if another is acting as its alter
ego, even if that alter ego is another corporation.”207 Secondly, on the
choice of law question, the court stated clearly that “[s]tate law is . . . to
determine whether and how to pierce the corporate veil.”208 The court went
on to apply Arkansas law.209 Citing Humphries v. Bray,210 a case on

203. See, e.g., Coombs v. Unique Refinishers, Inc., No. 2:12CV102, 2013 WL 1319773, at *1 (N.D.
Miss. Mar. 27, 2013).
204. Epps v. Stewart Information Services Corp., 327 F.3d 642 (8th Cir. 2003).
205. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Security Fin. Corp. of Okla., Inc., 152 P.3d 165, 174 (Okla. 2006);
Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG, 646 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2011).
206. Making this a Box 2 case in Table 3. See supra note 158.
207. Epps, 327 F.3d at 649.
208. Id.
209. Note that Arkansas law is both the law of forum as well as the law of incorporation of the
subsidiaries. See id.
210. Humphries v. Bray, 611 S.W.2d 791, 791 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981).
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liability piercing, the court stated that the piercing test “is founded in equity
and is applied when the facts warrant its application to prevent injustice.”211
Thus, the court seems to have adopted the same piercing test as used in
liability piercing. Applying the test to the facts, it was found that the
defendant was no more than an ordinary shareholder to the Arkansas
subsidiaries. The piercing failed accordingly, and so did personal
jurisdiction.
2. Category 2
Category 2 accords with Category 1 in terms of the choice of law
analysis but differs regarding the substantive test. Instead of copying the
test of liability piercing, courts adopting the approach of Category 2 argue
that the substantive test should be tailored for the purpose of jurisdictional
piercing due to their differences.212
It must be noted that Category 2 is one of the two best accepted
approaches. Whilst Category 1 and its liability test seem to be more
popular, the jurisdictional specific test still accounts for more than 20% of
all approaches. More importantly, courts adopting Category 2, as shown in
the discussion in Question 4 above and PHC-Minden case below, have
clearly given more thought to explaining why it is the better approach. On
the other hand, courts adopting Category 1 rarely display the same effort
and seem to have used the liability approach out of convenience. The focus
on control for the core element of the jurisdictional specific is hardly
surprising and is consistent with the leading authorities discussed here.
PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.213 is an example of a
Category 2 approach. Texas has been the most consistent jurisdiction in
applying a jurisdiction specific test for jurisdictional piercing, and PHCMinden is one of the best representative cases on this position by the Texas
Supreme Court.214
PHC-Minden is a products liability case. The manufacturer filed a
third party claim against a hospital in Louisiana. The issue was whether
Texas could assume jurisdiction over the hospital. Whilst the hospital was
not a Texas resident, the manufacturer argued that its parent, a Tennessee
corporation, did business in Texas and the parent’s contacts should be

211. Humphries, 611 S.W.2d at 793.
212. See Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Haygood, 402 S.W.3d 766, 779 (Tex. 2013)
(“We note that ‘jurisdictional veil-piercing’ is distinct from ‘substantive veil-piercing,’ so imputing a
related entity’s contacts for jurisdictional purposes requires a showing that the parent controls the
subsidiary’s internal operations and affairs.”).
213. PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2007).
214. See also BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002).
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imputed to the hospital, thereby subjecting the hospital to Texas’s
jurisdiction.
On the question of jurisdictional piercing, the court began by
approving jurisdictional piercing as a means of acquiring jurisdiction,
holding that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction may exist over a nonresident defendant
if the relationship between the foreign corporation and its parent
corporation that does business in Texas is one that would allow the court to
impute the parent corporation’s ‘doing business’ to the subsidiary.”215
While the court did not expressly address the choice of law issue, it is clear
from the judgment that the court adopted state law. For example, the court
stated that “the party seeking to ascribe one corporation’s actions to another
by disregarding their distinct corporate entities prove this allegation
because Texas law presumes that two separate corporations are distinct
entities.”216 It then clarified that Texas’s test is jurisdictional specific,
stating that “veil-piercing for purposes of liability (“substantive veilpiercing”) is distinct from imputing one entity’s contacts to another for
jurisdictional purposes (“jurisdictional veil-piercing”).”217 This distinction
is mainly caused by the fact that jurisdictional piercing involves
consideration of due process.218 Regarding the components of the test,
most notably, “fraud — which is vital to [liability] piercing . . . — has no
place in assessing contacts to determine jurisdiction.”219 Instead, “atypical
control” is the only prerequisite for the piercing test.220 In addition, the
court added that certain factors that are relevant to liability piercing had no
relevance to jurisdictional piercing, such as sharing of names and
undercapitalization.221 Applying the above test to the facts, it was found
that there was no atypical control exerted by the parent over the hospital
and the case was accordingly dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
3. Category 3
Category 3 is the category that takes away the states’ authority in
terms of choice of law and applies a uniform substantive test that resembles
the one used in the liability context. There are only four Category 3 cases,
the least among the four categories. The reason for the lack of support for

215. PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 173.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 174.
218. Id. (“This makes sense in light of the fact that personal jurisdiction involves due process
considerations that may not be overridden by statutes or the common law.”).
219. Id. at 175.
220. See id. at 176.
221. PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 174.
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this approach may lie in the odd Cannon case.
Whilst uncertainties revolve around the true meaning of Cannon, one
way of interpreting it could fit it into this category. First, as mentioned in
Section II, Cannon was decided before both International Shoe and Erie.
Thus, the principle that it laid down on jurisdictional piercing could be
interpreted as federal common law.222 While Cannon could be theoretically
overruled by both Erie and International Shoe,223 the case remains valid in
view of Supreme Court’s decision in Keeton.224 Apart from that, there has
been a long line of lower cases applying Cannon to jurisdictional
piercing.225 Thus, it can be argued that Cannon has mandated a federal
standard for jurisdictional piercing despite the lack of Supreme Court
authority on how Cannon can be reconciled with International Shoe.
Whilst Justice Brandeis avoided using the term liability piercing in
Cannon,226 the most decisive factor cited by the court in Cannon appears to
be corporate formality. This is different from the classic three-prong
approach but does fit with another line of classic piercing cases.227
Although this formalistic approach and the control-focused approach of
Category 2 do not require the fraud prong, Cannon’s emphasis could be
much more stringent than the test of Category 2. For large corporations, it
is much easier for them to maintain corporate formalities, thus rendering it
difficult to pierce the corporate veil under the more flexible and equitable
based approach.228
However, as Table 11 has shown, much to the expectation of
Professor Blumberg,229 Cannon has become a non-factor in the area of
jurisdictional piercing. In fact, there are only thirty-five cases that have
cited Cannon in the three-year research period according to Westlaw, and
most of them simply cited Cannon’s basic premise of maintaining the
independent separateness of companies in jurisdiction without relying on

222. See supra note 22.
223. See John A. Swain & Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal Jurisdiction Over
Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. REV. 445, 456 (2004).
224. See supra note 22.
225. See Swain & Aguilar, supra note 223, at 450 (“Over 500 published cases have cited Cannon
since 1925.”).
226. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
227. See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 24–28 (“The criteria for the Cannon doctrine will be
immediately recognized as very much the same as one of the alternative criteria for establishing the first
prong of classic piercing jurisprudence, turning on the subsidiary’s lack of separate existence.”).
228. See Voxman, supra note 20, at 330 n.9 (“Some commentators argue that Cannon is too
formalistic in the sense that the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship will almost always
result in the recognition of the corporate separation between the parent and subsidiary for jurisdictional
purposes.”).
229. See BLUMBERG ET AL., supra note 23, at 24–26 (“With passage of time, the authority of
Cannon has been significantly eroded.”).
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Cannon for the actual jurisdictional test. As much as the formalistic
approach becomes a thing in the past in liability piercing, the same seems
to be the case for jurisdictional piercing.
4. Category 4
Category 4 is the exact opposite to Category 1. It can be seen as a
further transformation of Cannon. As Cannon has not made it very clear
what substantive test to apply, some courts therefore have decided to adopt
a jurisdictional specific test instead. Thus, it may be regarded as a mix of
Categories 2 and 3. In terms of piercing rate, the contrast with Category 2
is great. Category 2 has the highest piercing rate while Category 4 has the
lowest. This again reflects the huge distinction in piercing rates between
the jurisdictional specific test and liability test as it has been extensively
discussed in Question 4 above.
None of the cases adopting this category in the empirical research
explained clearly why this is the proper approach. Searching through older
authorities, the leading case that explained this approach was Energy
Reserve.230 In that case, the Kansas District Court took a very innovative
view of choice of law. According to the court, the minimum contacts test
is the one and only avenue in establishing jurisdiction since International
Shoe.231 Technically speaking, the court was of the opinion that piercing
the corporate veil does not play “any proper role in the analysis of the
constitutional propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction.”232 This is because
“[t]he formalistic approach of the alter ego doctrine . . . is irrelevant to the
question [of] whether the exercise of jurisdiction over an absent parent
corporation would violate the Due Process Clause.”233 In other words,
there can only be one federal standard based on minimum contacts. Based
on this approach, the “piercing” test is necessarily jurisdictional specific.
The two-prong test of control and fraud that Category 1 used for both
liability and jurisdictional purposes will be merged with the standard
minimum contacts test. From the court’s perspective, components of
liability piercing are relevant but not necessary for the finding of
jurisdiction:
Concededly, a corporation’s relationship with an affiliated
corporation in the forum is relevant to the due process
230. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483 (D. Kan. 1978).
231. Id. at 496 (“All exercise of state court jurisdiction, and impliedly the exercise of personal
jurisdiction in federal court . . . must be analyzed under the standards of International Shoe.”).
232. Id. at 490.
233. In re Teletronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 909, 915 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
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question in a manner different from that in which it pertains
to the corporate law question of alter ego relationships and
“veil piercing.” For alter ego purposes the nature of the
relationship the identity between the corporations is alone
controlling. For jurisdictional purposes, the fact of the
existence of the relationship however substantial or
attenuated the relationship may be is a minimum “contact,
tie or relation” with the forum that may render possible the
constitutional exercise of jurisdiction if the relevant factors,
including both convenience and the orderly administration of
the laws, balance in that direction. The mere existence of the
relationship is one relevant factor. The nature of the
relationship the degree of control or identity bears upon the
weight to be given that one factor, but it does not foreclose
reliance on this factor as a legitimate consideration in the
due process analysis. The distinction between the two
standards should be readily apparent.234
Accordingly, gone are the rigid requirements of passing control and
fraud prongs. Instead, control and fraud are all but two factors on the long
list of facts considered by the court to see whether the case warrants the
finding of minimum contacts.
Both Categories 2 and 4 advocate a jurisdictional specific test.
However, the test of Category 2 appears to be about customizing the
traditional piercing test whilst Category 4, as explained by Energy Reserve,
could be viewed as rejecting the pigeonhole approach and merging the
jurisdictional test with minimum contacts. Besides, technically Category 2
still tries to interpret the identity of the “person” who is subject to the
minimum contacts test. On the other hand, Category 4 under Energy
Reserve does not interpret the identity of the “person” but what constitutes
a “contact.”
However, even by looking at the cases in Category 4, it seems that the
Energy Reserve approach above is devoid of practical significance. No
case during the three-year research period relied on the Energy Reserve
approach. Even for raw cases, there are only four cases that have cited
Energy Reserve and In re Teletronics during the three-year research period.
Despite the well-reasoned argument of Energy Reserve, the lack of support
probably stems from a lack of higher courts’ endorsement both at the State
Supreme Court or Federal Court of Appeals level.235 It is also too far from
234. Energy Reserve, 460 F. Supp. at 507.
235. In Hart Holding Co. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., the Court of Chancery of Delaware
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the more established practices of Categories 1 and 2 which makes it a
“dangerous innovation”236 for the courts. Finally, as will be shown in
Amrep below, the same result desired by the judge could be easily achieved
by Categories 1 and 2, particularly Category 2. Thus, there is no need for
the courts to overhaul their entire regime.
Alto Eldorado Partnership v. Amrep237 is an example of a Category 4
approach and is a case decided by the Court of Appeal of New Mexico.
Despite the lack of support of the Energy Reserve approach based on data
derived from the empirical review, Amrep is still a worthwhile case to
examine for the purpose of this article as the three judges in the case each
vowed for Categories 1, 2 and 4 respectively.
The case revolved around whether the New Mexico court had
jurisdiction over Amrep, an out-of-state parent company listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. The key issue was whether jurisdiction could be
based on Amrep’s relationship with its New Mexico subsidiary.
The first judge, Judge Kennedy, adopted the Category 4 approach.238
Following the lead of Energy Reserve, Judge Kennedy did not require “all
of the elements of alter ego be proven in order to hale a foreign corporate
parent into court, but [he] can and will consider whatever elements a
plaintiff shows in assessing minimum contacts.”239 More particularly on
control, he was of the view that “[t]he corporate relationship might also be
probative of whether it is fundamentally fair to require the defendant to
defend a suit in the forum.”240 This is the same for the fraud factor.241
Finding that Amrep exerted excessive control over the subsidiary in New
Mexico, including its day-to-day operations, Judge Kennedy found the
necessary minimum contacts to claim jurisdiction.
The second judge, Judge Sutin, concurred with the finding of
jurisdiction but not the reasoning of Judge Kennedy. His approach was
exactly the same as Category 2. He started with the traditional three-prong
liability piercing test adopted by New Mexico. After reviewing certain
precedents, he found that “[a] prima facie showing of instrumentality or
rejected Energy Reserves as a case rarely followed. See No. 11514, 1992 WL 127567, at *718 (Del.
Ch. May 28, 1992) (“It has not met with wide or easy acceptance elsewhere. It certainly does not
represent the law of Delaware.”).
236. See Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
237. Alto Eldorado Partnership v. Amrep, 124 P.3d 585 (N.M. 2005).
238. Id. at 595 (“[T]his principle in holding that due process guided by elements of an alter ego
analysis frame our inquiry into the district court's personal jurisdiction over Amrep. The question then
is not whether corporate law restricts our jurisdiction in contravention of the above principle, but
whether due process allows for it.”).
239. Id. at 594.
240. Id.
241. Id. (“[T]he showing of formation for an improper purpose . . . while not constitutionally
mandated, might also be probative.”).
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domination should be sufficient to establish the minimum contacts
necessary for jurisdiction without also having to prove the improper or
fraudulent purpose and proximate causation elements required to establish
liability.”242 Thus, his approach is the same as PHC-Minden, requiring just
the first control prong for jurisdictional piercing. Finding the plaintiff had
presented sufficient evidence for the first prong, he dismissed Amrep’s
motion for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Finally, the third judge, Judge Packard, delivered the dissenting
opinion. He adopted the classic Category 1 test. Going through a long list
of authorities, he criticized the other judges’ approach as not being
supported by precedents. Instead, he believed that the traditional threeprong liability test was proper.243 To justify his approach, he reasoned that
“corporations are formed precisely for the purpose of insulating the owners
thereof and such purpose ought to be respected, whether for liability or
jurisdiction.”244
Table 12 - Underlying claim of jurisdictional piercing
Contract Tort
Statute Unclear

Total

Number of
cases
Percentage of
jurisdictional
piercing cases
Pierced cases

43

32

28

2

105

40.95%

30.48%

26.67%

1.90%

100%

13

8

9

1

31

Piercing rate

31.71%

25%

32.14%

50%

29.52%

Finally, we look at whether the jurisdictional piercing rate is
influenced by the underlying claim. Under prevailing corporate theory, it is
believed that courts should be more willing to piece corporate veil in tort
cases than contract cases due to the fact that plaintiffs in contracting cases
will have the opportunity to protect themselves by choosing the more

242. Alto Eldorado, 124 P.3d at 599.
243. Id. at 600 (“Other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have unequivocally held that for
purposes of personal jurisdiction, it is not sufficient to establish only instrumentality, and instead a
plaintiff must also establish that the corporation that is using another corporation as its instrumentality
has formed it or is using it to perpetrate a fraud or other injustice or for some other improper purpose.”).
244. Id.
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solvent counterparty.245 This theory was found to be incompatible with the
data from the Thompson Study.246 For jurisdictional piercing, one might
argue that the court should be more willing to grant a plaintiff’s request to
pierce jurisdictionally in tort cases considering that plaintiffs in contract
cases can choose to contract directly with the out-of-state parent in order to
get the forum court to have specific jurisdiction thereto. However, the data
shows the same puzzling picture as in the Thompson Study. It is found that
contract cases actually have a higher piercing rate (40.95%) than that of tort
cases (30.48%). This finding, however, is not conclusive due to the lack of
tort cases in the samples here.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In connection with the current jurisdictional piercing practice, it is
clear that the contemporary approach is to leave the decision on choice of
law to each state while not supporting a federal standard across the nation.
Of course, simply having a majority of courts adopting the former approach
does not necessarily mean that it is the better approach. However, without
any clear precedent from the Supreme Court, each state reaches this
approach organically instead of having a standard imposed on them from
the top. This fact suggests at least the advantage of assumed efficiency.
The analysis, however, should not stop there. The state choice of law
approach shall be subject to an important caveat, that is, jurisdictional
piercing must not be of such a low standard that renders the minimum
contacts test meaningless. The constitutional structure of jurisdictional
piercing under the state choice of law approach is to interpret what a
“person” means in the minimum contacts test. If the definition of “person”
is entirely up to the state to interpret without any limitation, it is
theoretically for the state to adopt an unreasonably low standard for
jurisdictional piercing, such as the ownership of shares. This point has
been raised by Brilmayer and Paisley succinctly, stating that:
the state may not alter the definition of state-created rights in
order to defeat a federal constitutional claim. Similarly, states
may not alter their procedural rules when federal rights are at
stake. Discriminatory treatment of federal rights is unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court will review a state law decision

245. See Thompson, supra note 13, at 1038.
246. See id. at 1058 (finding that “the results show that courts pierce more often in the contract
context than in tort context”).
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to determine whether it has a substantial basis in state law.247
A standard like that will essentially catch all passive out-of-state
holding companies which do nothing in the forum state other than holding
shares in a subsidiary that is subject to forum jurisdiction, and effectively
rendering minimum contact meaningless. In other words, this definition
will create minimum contacts for simple shareholding and violate the basic
minimum contact test.
By analogy, Daimler has shown that the Supreme Court will not
hesitate to clamp down on vicarious jurisdiction if the state test becomes so
lenient that it would render the minimum contacts standard meaningless.
As we have seen in that case, the Ninth Circuit’s version of the agency test
simply asks whether the agent is important to the parent.248 Justice
Ginsburg is of the view that such a low standard will have the effect of
subjecting every single multinational company to the jurisdiction of every
state where it does business with an agent.249 In essence, this is a floodgate
argument. While there is no reported jurisdictional piercing during the
research period that adopts a low standard as simple share ownership, this
is certainly an important threshold to bear in mind.
On the question of the substantive test, the issue of whether courts
should adopt a jurisdictional specific test seems to hinge on whether
jurisdictional piercing should be more lenient than liability piercing given
the much higher piercing rate yielded under the jurisdictional specific test.
The answer seems to be positive given that jurisdictional piercing simply
requires the defendant to defend himself in the forum instead of having the
liability conclusively imposed thereon. It also makes sense to restrict the
application of the fraud factor to liability piercing instead of jurisdictional
piercing. It is still hard to see why fraud has to be an essential element for
jurisdictional piercing. Piercing the corporate veil, even for liability
purposes, is influenced by the underlying cause of action.250 The prime
examples of a more lenient standard in a liability context are those cases
involving ERISA. In ERISA cases, courts almost always refer to the
federal policy behind ERISA to protect employees and thus always forgo

247. See Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 20, at 27.
248. See supra note 112. It is noted that in discussing the Ninth Circuit’s test on agency, the
Supreme Court did not reject the test on the basis of it not being a uniform federal standard but simply
object to the broad test. This could be seen as a support to the conclusion of the author’s view on
Question 1, that is, to adopt states’ rules on jurisdictional piercing.
249. Id.
250. See Brennan v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 12-cv-10551, 2012 WL 3888218, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 7, 2012) (“It is well established that piercing the corporate veil is not itself a cause of
action.”).
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the fraud element as an essential factor.251 For jurisdictional piercing, it can
be argued that underlying federal justification for the assertion of
jurisdiction is purposeful availment. This certainly is a much lower
standard than fraud. If a parent company exerts excessive control over the
subsidiary to the extent that it becomes merely an instrument of the
corporation for the purpose of doing business in the forum, it could be
considered as purposefully making available the benefits and protection of
the forum. Fraud, on the other hand, will impose the higher standard that
the underlying federal policy demands. Unlike liability piercing where
piercing is supposed to happen only when the privilege of incorporation is
“abused,” jurisdiction does not operate in the same way. As long as an outof-state corporation has obtained the protection and benefits of the forum,
the quid pro quo is to be subject to the forum’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the
fraud factor, apparently a factor installed to cater for the concept of “abuse”
can have no place in the jurisdictional piercing formula. The emphasis on
control factor can also be found in the rare federal court judgments that
have discussed jurisdictional piercing after Daimler.252
It is noted that adopting a more lenient, jurisdictional specific standard
will have the effect of expanding the jurisdiction of the United States.
While the normative aspect of the expansion of the jurisdiction is a much
larger topic that this article intends to cover, such expansion, at least as far
as a jurisdictional specific standard will bring thereto, is justified. First, it
must be noted that unlike changing the minimum contacts standard,
jurisdictional piercing remains an exception that will be applied by courts
with caution. The eventual expansion of jurisdiction, therefore, as a result
of the adjustment brought by the jurisdictional specific test will be limited.
In addition, as we have seen in Section IV, a jurisdictional specific test only
has a 5.45% higher piercing rate than the liability test. Thus, it is expected
that the adjustment will only help such marginal cases, but it will not help
in overhauling the entire jurisdictional regime.
Normatively, although the Supreme Court has shown concern on the
effect that expanding the United States’ jurisdiction will have on comity,
the modest expansion suggested here should be acceptable. In McIntyre, it
is clear that the three Justices led by Justice Ginsburg are ready to extend
the jurisdiction of New Jersey to cover McIntyre UK. Drawing on the
equivalent European Union jurisdiction rules, Justice Ginsburg thought it
251. See NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 553 (3d Cir. 1983) (In claims pursuant to the
National Labor Relations Act, the standard for establishing the existence of an alter ego is less
burdensome: “[t]he focus of the alter ego doctrine . . . is on the existence of a disguised continuance or
an attempt to avoid the obligations of a collective bargaining agreement through a sham transaction or a
technical change in operations.”).
252. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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was absurd for New Jersey to have no jurisdiction as the place of injury
when the home court of McIntyre UK would have allowed such jurisdiction
should the injury happen in the European Union.253 This is just one
example in which current United States jurisdiction is actually not as
expansive as it is perceived. This view is also supported by Professor
Trevor Hartley, a leading scholar on EU law and private international
law.254
Ultimately, adopting the jurisdictional specific test reaffirms the
overall goal of jurisdictional piercing; that is, to bring the jurisdictional test
closer to the actual world. As stated by Justice Weinstein in Bulova Watch
Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd., “we cannot apply the law in a way that
has any hope of making sense unless we attempt to visualize the actual
world with which it interacts.”255 Jurisdictional piercing is valuable
because of that function and the jurisdictional specific test will help in
achieving that.

253. See McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2803 (“The Court’s judgment also puts United States plaintiffs at a
disadvantage in comparison to similarly situated complainants elsewhere in the world. Of particular
note, within the European Union, in which the United Kingdom is a participant, the jurisdiction New
Jersey would have exercised is not at all exceptional.”).
254. See TREVOR C. HARTLEY, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION: TEXT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (2009) (“This survey suggests that there is no
ground for saying that American jurisdiction over European defendants is in general more extensive
than European jurisdiction over Americans; though it may be in certain cases. The real ground for
European resentment is the combination of jurisdictional rules that are fairly extensive; though not
necessarily more extensive than comparable European ones; with procedural rules that are significantly
more favourable to the plaintiff. From a purely jurisdictional point of view, American law is no more
extensive than the law of many European countries.”).
255. Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. K. Hattori & Co., Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1328 (1981).

